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ANDREW B. COAN† 
Arguments about the nature of judicial review and appropriate methods of 
constitutional interpretation based on the “writtenness” of the Constitution date 
back at least to Marbury v. Madison.  In recent years, originalists ranging 
from Jack Balkin to Keith Whittington to Randy Barnett have argued in vary-
ing fashion that an originalist interpretive approach follows logically from “our 
commitment to a written constitution.”  This argument has been extraordinari-
ly important to the ongoing originalism renaissance, but it is a mistake.  Noth-
ing—or virtually nothing—follows from the writtenness of the U.S. Constitu-
tion.  One can be committed to a written constitution in any number of ways 
for any number of reasons, the vast majority of which do not entail an original-
ist interpretive approach. 
The originalist argument to the contrary is one instance of a broader rhe-
torical phenomenon that the philosopher C.L. Stevenson helpfully labeled “per-
suasive definition.”  It is an attempt to resolve a normative debate through re-
definition of a normatively charged term—in this case, “interpretation.”  There 
is broad agreement that judges should interpret, rather than make, the law.  
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Thus, by redefining “interpretation” to include only originalist interpretation, 
originalists appear to answer the normative question of how judges should de-
cide constitutional cases.  But it is only an appearance.  Their argument sheds 
no light on the actual normative question at issue, which is how we should 
want judges to decide constitutional cases. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Arguments about the nature of judicial review and appropriate 
methods of constitutional interpretation based on the “writtenness” of 
the Constitution date back at least to Marbury v. Madison.1  There, 
Chief Justice Marshall famously wrote the following: 
The powers of the legislature are defined, and limited; and that those 
limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written.  To 
what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation 
committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those 
intended to be restrained? . . . 
 . . . . 
 
1 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
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 Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contem-
plate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the na-
tion, and consequently the theory of every such government must be, 
that an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void. 
 This theory is essentially attached to a written constitution, and is 
consequently to be considered, by this court, as one of the fundamental 
principles of our society.
2
 
This passage has fueled political, legal, and academic controversy for 
more than two centuries, with scores of commentators echoing Mar-
shall’s contention that a written constitution requires judicial review3 
and a nearly equal number attacking it.4  Marshall’s defenders argue 
that written constraints on the power of the political branches—
indeed, the very notion of constitutional supremacy over ordinary 
law—would be meaningless if judges were required to enforce un-
constitutional legislation.5  Critics counter that written constitutional 
commitments can be enforced through a variety of institutional me-
chanisms, not just judicial review.6  Moreover, the actual constitutional 
text, on which Marshall and his defenders place such weight, is com-
pletely silent on the question.7  Surely, the critics contend, that prec-
ludes any claim that judicial review is an essential feature of our con-
stitutional design. 
 The back and forth is by now almost soothingly familiar.  In re-
cent years, however, a diverse group of constitutional theorists—
ranging from Randy Barnett to Keith Whittington to Jack Balkin—has 
attempted to extend Marshall’s argument to less familiar terrain.  In 
varying fashion, these theorists argue that “our commitment to a writ-
ten constitution” entails not only judicial review but also an originalist 
approach to constitutional interpretation.8  Their argument takes sev-
 
2 Id. at 176-77. 
3 See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Irrepressible Myth of Marbury, 101 MICH. L. 
REV. 2706, 2707-09 (2003); Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Origins of Judicial 
Review, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 887, 914 (2003). 
4 See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 6 (Yale Univ. 
Press 2d ed. 1986) (1962); William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madi-
son, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1, 23; Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 
115 YALE L.J. 1346, 1383-84 (2006); see also Bernadette Meyler, Daniel Defoe and the Writ-
ten Constitution, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 73, 75-76 (2008) (canvassing the debate). 
5 See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 3, at 2714. 
6 See, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 4, at 261; Van Alstyne, supra note 4, at 22. 
7 See BICKEL, supra note 4, at 5; Van Alstyne, supra note 4, at 22. 
8 See Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 636 
(1999); see also KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 50-61 
(1999); Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 303 
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eral forms, some of them parasitic on other justifications for original-
ism, such as popular sovereignty and the rule of law.  But in its strong-
est version, it is offered as a freestanding reason why judges should 
embrace an originalist approach to constitutional interpretation.  The 
idea is that writing, by its very nature, fixes the meaning of a text at 
the moment it is written.  Otherwise, written words are no more than 
meaningless marks on a page, subject to the whim and caprice of 
every individual reader who chances upon them.  If this were true, we 
might as well have an unwritten constitution, which of course we do 
not.  Ergo, the constitutional text must be interpreted according to its 
original meaning.  That is simply what it means to be committed to a 
written constitution. 
 This argument has been extraordinarily influential in the ongo-
ing originalism renaissance.  Indeed, it may be the most distinctive 
normative claim of “The New Originalism.”9  Yet it has received vir-
tually no sustained critical attention.10  This Article seeks to remedy 
that.  Its central claim is simple:  nothing—or virtually nothing—
follows from the writtenness of the U.S. Constitution.  One can be 
committed to a written constitution in any number of ways for any 
 
(2007) [hereinafter Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning]; Jack M. Balkin, Original 
Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 427, 429 (2007) [hereinaf-
ter Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption]; Vasan Kesavan & Michael 
Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. 
L.J. 1113, 1127-28 (2003); Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enter-
prise, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 47, 71 (2006); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Constitution 
Prescribe Rules for Its Own Interpretation?, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 857, 859 (2009).  Historical 
antecedents of this argument can be found in South Carolina v. United States and Muller 
v. Oregon.  See South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 448 (1905) (“The Consti-
tution is a written instrument.  As such its meaning does not alter.  That which it meant 
when adopted it means now.”); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 420 (1908) (“Constitu-
tional questions, it is true, are not settled by even a consensus of present public opi-
nion, for it is the peculiar value of a written constitution that it places in unchanging 
form limitations upon legislative action, and thus gives a permanence and stability to 
popular government which otherwise would be lacking.”). 
9 New Originalists themselves tend to emphasize the shift from original intent to 
original public meaning.  See, e.g., Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 609 (2004); Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism 18-19 (Un-
iv. of Ill. Coll. of Law, Pub. Law and Legal Theory Research Papers Series, Research 
Paper No. 07-24, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1120244.  For reasons 
ably discussed by Mark Tushnet, there is less to this distinction than meets the eye.  See 
Mark Tushnet, Heller and the New Originalism, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 609, 612 (2008). 
10 The best existing treatments are Richard A. Primus, When Should Original Mean-
ings Matter?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 165, 177-80 (2008), and Mitchell N. Berman, Original-
ism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 59-64 (2009).  Both are helpful but brief.  As a conse-
quence, neither recognizes or responds to the full range of analytically distinct 
originalist arguments from writtenness.   
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number of reasons, the vast majority of which do not entail an origi-
nalist interpretive approach.  For example, one can be committed to 
the constitutional text as a focal point for legal coordination in the 
manner of the rules of the road; as a flexible framework for common 
law elaboration; as a locus of normative discourse in a flourishing con-
stitutional culture; or as one of many legitimate ingredients in a plu-
ralist practice of constitutional adjudication.  Obviously, each of these 
approaches is debatable on the merits.  The key point is that all of 
them, no less than originalism, accord the written text of the Constitu-
tion a prominent role. 
 At this point, a contemporary originalist will be inclined to re-
spond that none of the approaches just described deserves the name 
of constitutional interpretation.  “Of course,” she might say, “a written 
document can be put to any number of uses.  That is perfectly ob-
vious.  Indeed, why stop with fancy uses like a framework for common 
law constitutionalism or a locus of normative discourse in a flourish-
ing constitutional culture?  The Constitution might just as easily serve 
to line a hamster cage or to fashion a colony of origami sea lions.  
Constitutional interpretation, however, implies more than simple use—
specifically, a search for the actual meaning of the written text, which 
is to say its original meaning.”11  If she is careful, our hypothetical ori-
ginalist will concede that her argument speaks only to the nature of 
interpretation, not to the legitimacy of the Constitution.  The argu-
ment cannot, that is, rule out the possibility that the Constitution is 
illegitimate, in which case we should consider scrapping it altogeth-
er.12  But so long as we accept the Constitution as binding law, she will 
insist that originalism is not merely the best interpretive approach but 
the only approach that is truly interpretive. 
This widely invoked argument is one instance of a broader rhetor-
ical phenomenon that the philosopher C.L. Stevenson helpfully la-
beled “persuasive definition.”13  That is to say, it is an attempt to re-
solve a normative debate through tendentious redefinition of a 
 
11 See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, supra note 8, at 60-61; Saikrishna B. Prakash, The Misun-
derstood Relationship Between Originalism and Popular Sovereignty, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 485, 486-87 (2008); Michael Stokes Paulsen, How to Interpret the Constitution (and 
How Not to), 115 YALE L.J. 2037, 2056-57 (2006) (reviewing AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERI-
CA’S CONSTITUTION (2005); JED RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY (2005)). 
12 See Saikrishna B. Prakash, Overcoming the Constitution, 91 GEO. L.J. 407, 420 
(2003) (reviewing RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION (2001)); 
see also Lawson & Seidman, supra note 8, at 71; Paulsen, supra note 11, at 2056-57. 
13 Charles Leslie Stevenson, Persuasive Definitions, 47 MIND 331, 331 (1938) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). 
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normatively charged term—in this case, two terms:  interpretation and 
binding law.  There is broad agreement that judges should interpret, 
rather than make, the law.  Thus, by defining interpretation as syn-
onymous with originalist interpretation, originalists appear to answer 
the normative question of how judges should decide constitutional 
cases.  But it is only an appearance.  Their argument sheds no light on 
the actual normative question at issue.  Our commitment to a written 
constitution may mean that we are unlikely to accept an answer to that 
question that does not accord some role to the constitutional text.  
But all plausible theories—not just originalism—do that. 
The same goes for the originalist argument that other interpretive 
approaches do not treat the written Constitution as binding law.  
There is broad agreement that the Constitution is law binding judges 
as well as other government officials.  Thus, by defining law—or more 
precisely, binding law—as synonymous with originalist interpretation, 
originalists appear to show that judges are obligated to adhere to the 
Constitution’s original meaning.  But again, it is only an appearance.  
Their argument assumes away the normative question of how judges 
should decide constitutional cases.  As before, our commitment to the 
written Constitution may mean we are unlikely to accept an answer 
that does not accord some role to the constitutional text.  We are also 
unlikely to accept an answer that falls outside the family of activities 
conventionally understood as law.  But all plausible theories satisfy 
both of these requirements.  The writtenness of the Constitution is 
therefore irrelevant to the choice between originalism and other 
plausible contenders.  Or so this Article shall contend.14 
Part I surveys and classifies the various originalist arguments from 
writtenness.  Most prove question begging or parasitic on other justifi-
cations for originalism.  In its strongest form, however, the argument 
from writtenness emerges as a coherent and potentially independent 
justification for an originalist interpretive approach.  Part II assesses 
this strong form of the argument and finds it wanting.  Put simply, the 
strong argument from writtenness depends on originalism being the 
 
14 The claim is, in important respects, a narrow one.  It is agnostic on the lively 
internecine disputes among originalists, of which there are a great many.  See Berman, 
supra note 10, at 9-16 (summarizing the many disputes among originalists).  It is also 
agnostic on the possibility that we have an unwritten, as well as a written, Constitution.  
See Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1974); 
Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408 (2007).  It is 
even agnostic on the ultimate desirability of an originalist interpretive approach.  
There is a simple reason for this:  none of these controversies can be resolved one way 
or the other by deductive reasoning from our commitment to a written constitution. 
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only interpretive approach that can make sense of our commitment to 
a written constitution.  This is a demanding claim, and Part II shows 
that it is unsustainable:  many nonoriginalist interpretive approaches 
can also make sense of our commitment to a written constitution.  
Those approaches may or may not be superior to originalism on other 
grounds, but it is those grounds, and not the writtenness of the Con-
stitution, that must decide the issue.  Part III anticipates and responds 
to the two originalist objections mentioned earlier—that other inter-
pretive approaches are not truly interpretive and that other ap-
proaches do not treat the written Constitution as binding law.  Both 
objections are shown to rely on the rhetorical technique of persuasive 
definition.  As such, they shed no light on the underlying question of 
how judges should decide constitutional cases. 
I.  ORIGINALIST ARGUMENTS FROM WRITTENNESS 
The originalist argument from writtenness takes various forms.  In 
fact, it may be more profitably understood not as a single cohesive ar-
gument but as a family of related arguments, united by their common 
reliance on the written character of the U.S. Constitution.  That family 
has three analytically distinct, though frequently conflated, branches, 
which it is the goal of this Part to describe and disambiguate.  The 
first, on close examination, turns out to be entirely dependent on 
other controversial normative justifications for originalism, such as 
popular sovereignty and the practical need to constrain the power of 
judges and other government officials.  If those justifications are per-
suasive, this group of arguments from writtenness is persuasive, too.  
But the converse is equally true; these arguments therefore add little 
to the normative debate.  The second branch relies on the writtenness 
of the Constitution as implicit evidence of the Framers’ and Ratifiers’ 
commitment to originalism.  But, of course, that commitment is nor-
matively significant only if one is already convinced that the original 
meaning or intent of the Constitution matters.  Only the third branch, 
which argues that originalism follows from the essential nature of writ-
tenness, could possibly provide an independent reason for contempo-
rary judges to adopt an originalist interpretive approach.  This Part 
examines the three branches in turn.15 
 
15 No proponent of the argument from writtenness conceptualizes it in exactly this 
way.  But the tripartite structure elaborated in this Part is implicit in the writings of var-
ious originalists.  Making it explicit facilitates analytic clarity.  It also helps to distin-
guish the strongest version of the argument from weaker variants and thus to present 
the argument in its best possible light.      
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A.  Branch One 
Attempts to link writtenness to other controversial normative justi-
fications for originalism are among the most common originalist ar-
guments from writtenness.  These attempts are frequently presented 
as freestanding arguments for originalism.  Indeed, their proponents 
sometimes claim outright that the writtenness of the Constitution log-
ically entails originalism.  But for what should be obvious reasons, 
these arguments are no more persuasive than the hotly contested 
normative premises on which they rest. 
1.  Popular Sovereignty 
Two such premises are especially well represented in originalist 
arguments from writtenness.  The first is the familiar claim that the 
Constitution is the command of the sovereign people, and as such 
both the source and limit of the governmental powers it establishes.16  
Originalism, in its canonical form, may be seen as a corollary of this 
view.  Many have made this point17 but perhaps none more famously 
than James Madison, arguing against the Jay Treaty in the House of 
Representatives in 1796: 
[W]hatever veneration might be entertained for the body of men who 
formed our constitution, the sense of that body could never be regarded 
as the oracular guide in the expounding [of] the constitution.  As the in-
strument came from them, it was nothing more than the draught of a 
plan, nothing but a dead letter, until life and validity were breathed into 
it, by the voice of the people, speaking through the several state conven-
tions.  If we were to look therefore, for the meaning of the instrument, 
beyond the face of the instrument, we must look for it not in the general 
 
16 The classic statement is Alexander Hamilton’s in Federalist 78: 
 There is no position which depends on clearer principles than that every act 
of a delegated authority, contrary to the tenor of the commission under which it 
is exercised, is void.  No legislative act, therefore, contrary to the Constitution, 
can be valid.  To deny this would be to affirm that the deputy is greater than his 
principal; that the servant is above his master; that the representatives of the 
people are superior to the people themselves; that men acting by virtue of pow-
ers may do not only what their powers do not authorize, but what they forbid. 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465-66 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
17 See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 364 (1977); ROBERT H. 
BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 143 (1990); WHITTINGTON, supra note 8, ch. 5; Mi-
chael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1127, 1136 (1998); Jack N. Rakove, The Original Intention of Original Understanding, 13 
CONST. COMMENT. 159, 161 (1996).   
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convention, which proposed, but in the state conventions, which ac-
cepted and ratified the constitution.
18
 
This argument from popular sovereignty is originalism’s trump card.  
Like other government officials, the theory goes, judges are not free 
agents.  They are the people’s agents, and exercise the judicial power 
only as such.  For them to improvise a constitutional tune as they go 
along would be to exercise sovereign power without popular consent 
and thus to usurp the people’s fundamental right to govern themselves. 
The argument from writtenness complements this account nicely.  
A written constitution can fix the will of the sovereign people, can 
serve as the textual embodiment of that will, only if it bears the mean-
ing the people understood it to bear when they ratified it.  To attach 
any other meaning to the constitutional text—whether that meaning 
derives from judicial precedent, linguistic evolution, or the policy pre-
ferences of contemporary judges—is to supplant the meaning fixed in 
writing by the people and thus to free the government from popular 
control.  Keith Whittington makes the point with characteristic felici-
ty:  “[T]he written Constitution, ratified by the sovereign people in 
convention, is the fundamental law, authorizing and limiting govern-
mental action . . . . The people can constrain their governmental 
agents only by fixing their will in an unchanging text.”19 
This argument is fine so far as it goes.  It is, however, subject to all 
the same objections as the standard popular sovereignty argument for 
originalism—most notably, the dead hand problem.  The people 
whose sovereignty an originalist written constitution would preserve 
are chiefly dead, white, male landowners, whose dictates Article V 
makes it exceedingly difficult (and in some cases impossible20) for the 
people of today to change.  From the perspective of democratic 
theory, it is not at all obvious that this arrangement is superior to one 
in which contemporary judges adhere to nonoriginalist precedent, 
track contemporary social consensus, or render pragmatic constitu-
 
18 16 JAMES MADISON, Remarks Before the House of Representatives:  Jay’s Treaty 
(Apr. 6, 1796), in THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 290, 295-96 ( J.C.A. Stagg et al. eds., 
1989).  The reliability of this speech as evidence of Madison’s own original understand-
ing has been questioned, see Rakove, supra note 17, at 160-61, but it is offered here only 
as a representative statement of the view it expresses. 
19 WHITTINGTON, supra note 8, at 56; see also Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 
supra note 8, at 304 (“We look to the original meaning of the words because if the 
meaning of the words changed over time, then the words will embrace different con-
cepts than those who had the authority to create the text sought to refer to.”). 
20 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. V (“[N]o State, without its Consent, shall be deprived 
of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.”). 
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tional judgments by their own best lights.21  After all, unlike most im-
portant constitutional provisions, contemporary judges can at least 
trace their authority to a democratic political process—presidential 
appointment and Senate confirmation—within living memory. 
The argument is too familiar to require further elaboration.  Nor 
is it necessary, for present purposes, to pass judgment on it.22  Certain-
ly, sophisticated originalist responses to the dead hand problem are 
available.23  Perhaps they are correct; perhaps not.  The important 
point is that the argument from writtenness is doing little, if any, in-
dependent work.  If it is normatively attractive to preserve the sove-
reignty of the prior generations of Americans who wrote and ratified 
the Constitution, or if doing so is somehow necessary to preserve the 
sovereignty of contemporary Americans,24 then interpreting the Con-
stitution as the written expression of their will might be warranted.  
But if these premises do not obtain, this version of the argument from 
writtenness tells us nothing about how judges should interpret the 
Constitution. 
2.  Constitutional Constraint 
An even more common version of the argument from writtenness 
holds that only originalism is consistent with the primary purpose of 
written constitutions—namely to subject the power of judges and, 
through them, other government officials, to fixed constitutional con-
straints.  The echo of Marbury should be obvious.  There, Chief Justice 
Marshall asked, “[T]o what purpose is that limitation committed to writ-
ing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be 
restrained?”25  Contemporary originalists ask, “To what purpose do we 
hold our government officials to written constitutional limitations, if the 
content of those limitations evolves over time according to the interpre-
tations of the very officials intended to be restrained?”  Randy Barnett’s 
formulation is illustrative:  “Putting a constitution in writing is condu-
 
21 See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. 
REV. 204, 230 (1980); Michael J. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 381, 382 
(1997); Adam M. Samaha, Dead Hand Arguments and Constitutional Interpretation, 108 
COLUM. L. REV. 606, 614 (2008). 
22 For a more opinionated take, see Andrew B. Coan, Talking Originalism, 2009 BYU 
L. REV. 847; Klarman, supra note 21, at 382; and Samaha, supra note 21, at 609, 613-25. 
23 See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, supra note 8, at 196-208; McConnell, supra note 17. 
24 Keith Whittington makes an argument to this effect.  See WHITTINGTON, supra 
note 8, at 156-57.  But see Coan, supra note 22, at 865. 
25 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803). 
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cive to preserving the rights of the people from infringement by gov-
ernment officials, but only if its original meaning is not contradicted or 
altered without adhering to formal amendment procedures.”26 
This argument may or may not be persuasive on its own terms.  As 
Adam Tomkins has explained, there is no reason in principle that a 
written constitution should be any more or less flexible—any more or 
less constraining—than an unwritten constitution.27  That depends on 
the content of the constitution, as understood by contemporary inter-
preters, as well as the accepted modes of constitutional revision, nei-
ther of which is linked in any necessary way to the formal medium in 
which a constitution is expressed.  It is at least theoretically possible to 
imagine a very inflexible unwritten constitution—historically stable, 
entrenched against change, interpreted according to fixed standards 
of interpretation understood to be firmly binding on the government 
officials applying them—and vice versa.  Nevertheless, it seems plausi-
ble that written constitutions, in practice, may have greater constrain-
ing potential than unwritten constitutions, if only because the precise 
content of the latter seems likely to be the subject of greater uncer-
tainty.28  Ultimately, this is an empirical question. 
Fortunately, it is a question that need not be resolved here.  Even 
if a written constitution, interpreted according to originalist methods, 
is an essential prerequisite for the existence of fixed constitutional 
constraints, it remains to be shown that fixed constitutional con-
straints are normatively preferable to the available alternatives.  Here, 
the argument from writtenness runs into all the objections commonly 
advanced against the standard constraint-based defenses of original-
ism:  original meaning is frequently ambiguous, limiting its power to 
constrain judges and other officials, even if those officials are acting in 
good faith and free of subconscious bias—both, of course, generous 
assumptions.  In fact, the history invoked in originalist opinions may 
give an insidious veneer of objectivity and passivity to judicial deci-
sions that are in reality the product of political choices.29  More fun-
 
26 Barnett, supra note 8, at 654. 
27 See ADAM TOMKINS, PUBLIC LAW 12-14 (2003). 
28 Cf. WHITTINGTON, supra note 8, at 52 (contrasting the supposed certainty of 
written constitutions with the supposed uncertainty of the unwritten British Constitu-
tion); Barnett, supra note 8, at 631 (analogizing the certainty-enhancing function of 
written constitutions to the certainty-enhancing function of written contracts).  
29 See Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term—Foreword:  A Political Court, 
119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 45 (2005); cf. Andrew B. Coan, Essay, Text as Truce:  A Peace Pro-
posal for the Supreme Court’s Costly War over the Eleventh Amendment, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2511, 2512 (2006) (noting the appearance of political decisionmaking in disputes over 
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damentally, original meaning is hardly the only available constraint on 
official power.  Judicial precedent,30 political process theories,31 or the 
Holmesian “puke” test32 might serve equally well, especially in light of 
the many institutional and political constraints that operate indepen-
dently of any theory of constitutional interpretation.33  Finally, even if 
these alternatives prove less effective than originalism qua constraint, 
one or more of them might produce better substantive results, on bal-
ance, than unswerving adherence to original meaning.34 
Again, for present purposes, it is unnecessary to pass judgment on 
these objections.  The critics might be right.  But original meaning al-
so might be more determinate or more substantively attractive (com-
pared to the plausible alternatives) than the critics of originalism have 
supposed.  The important point is that everything turns on these ques-
tions and virtually nothing on the argument from writtenness.  If orig-
inal meaning is the most effective and substantively attractive con-
straint available, judges should interpret the constitutional text ac-
cording to its original meaning to the extent possible.  If not, they 
should employ whatever alternative approach satisfies this criterion.  
As with popular sovereignty, writtenness is simply a nonfactor. 
 
the Eleventh Amendment’s original meaning); Richard Primus, Limits of Interpretivism, 
32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 159, 171 (2009) (cataloging recent Supreme Court cases in 
which views on original meaning break down along apparently political lines). 
30 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Originalism, Stare Decisis and the Promotion of Judicial 
Restraint, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 271, 273 (2005) (“[A] strong theory of 
precedent . . . would promote judicial restraint.”). 
31 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980) (arguing that the Supreme 
Court’s primary role is to ensure the fair and smooth functioning of the political process). 
32 See Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Laski (Oct. 23, 1926) (writ-
ing that a legislative act should not be disturbed “unless it makes us puke”), in 2 
HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS 887, 888 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953).  For an elaboration 
of this test in more traditionally judicial vernacular, see Justice Holmes’s celebrated 
dissent in Lochner v. New York.  198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that a law should not be overturned unless “a rational and fair man” would admit that 
it infringed “fundamental principles as they have been understood by the traditions of 
our people and our law”). 
33 See Coan, supra note 22, at 857-64; see also Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 
supra note 8, at 310 (“Constraining judges in a democracy is important.  But in practice 
most of that constraint does not come from theories of constitutional interpretation.  
It comes from institutional features of the political and legal system.”). 
34 For a fuller, but still summary, treatment of these objections, see Coan, supra 
note 22, at 865-69.  
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B.  Branch Two 
The second branch of the writtenness family regards the Constitu-
tion’s writtenness as evidence that its original design, purpose, or 
structure requires an originalist approach.  This branch, too, compris-
es multiple variations.  In its crudest form, it is a simple case of boot-
strapping:  by putting the Constitution in writing, the Framers and Ra-
tifiers intended to fix its original meaning irrevocably.  Ergo, that is 
the meaning we are bound to follow today.  Of course, such argu-
ments cannot persuade anyone who does not already accord the views 
of the Framers or Ratifiers authoritative weight.  This bootstrapping 
problem is basic to Branch Two, but the branch does comprise at least 
two subtler variants.  The first takes the writtenness of the Constitution 
to demonstrate a founding commitment either to fixed constitutional 
constraints or to popular sovereignty, which in turn entails an origi-
nalist approach to constitutional interpretation.  Call this the “Hybrid 
Strain,” since it blends Branches One and Two.  The second, even 
more intricate variant draws on Article VI and the interpretive con-
ventions in force at the Founding to claim that the Constitution itself 
prescribes an originalist approach.  Call this the “Self-Interpreting 
Strain,” since it purports to find binding interpretive instructions in 
the text of the Constitution itself.  Ultimately, both strains either dis-
solve into Branch One or succumb to the same bootstrapping prob-
lem as cruder variants of Branch Two. 
1.  The Hybrid Strain 
The Hybrid Strain is only subtly different from Branch One.  In-
stead of appealing directly to the values of popular sovereignty and 
constraint, it appeals to the Founders’ embrace of those values, which 
the writtenness of the Constitution is taken to demonstrate.  As Keith 
Whittington tells it in a careful and nuanced discussion, the Founders 
deliberately chose a written constitution for two reasons.  First, only a 
written document could be presented to the sovereign people for rati-
fication and thus provide a popular check on the actions of govern-
ment officials.35  Second, only a written constitution could guard 
against the evils the Founders had come to associate with the unwrit-
ten British Constitution—chiefly, uncertainty and mutability36 in the 
face of political temptation.  To serve either of these purposes, howev-
 
35 WHITTINGTON, supra note 8, at 55. 
36 Id. at 54. 
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er, the meaning of a written constitution had to be fixed at the date it 
was authoritatively ratified by the people.  Otherwise, the Constitution 
would cease to embody the will of the people and cease to provide a 
fixed bulwark against abuse by their governmental agents.  For these 
reasons, Whittington argues, only an originalist approach to constitu-
tional interpretation is consistent with the Founders’ embrace of a 
written constitution.37 
So stated, Whittington’s argument appears to rest entirely on the 
authority of the Founders’ reasons for embracing a written constitution, 
but he has provided no independent justification for treating those rea-
sons as authoritative.  This is the very essence of bootstrapping:  an at-
tempt to justify the authority of original meaning by reference to the 
very authority whose justification is in question.  Whittington is sensitive 
to this issue, however, and expressly disclaims any argument from au-
thority.  Rather, he suggests, we should look to the Founding “in search 
of other people who have thought about . . . whether or not to have a 
written constitution and thus may be expected to have considered the 
matter in depth.”38  In so doing, he openly acknowledges that the ar-
guments and historical purposes of the Founders “have weight because 
of their content, not their source.”39 
This acknowledgment distinguishes Whittington’s argument from 
the cruder bootstrapping variants of Branch Two, but it creates two 
other problems.  First, if it is truly the content and not the source of 
the Founders’ reasoning Whittington means to appeal to, that content 
is essentially identical to Branch One.  This does not mean we should 
not take it seriously, only that its success depends on the success of the 
hotly contested popular sovereignty and constitutional constraint ar-
guments for originalism.  As in Branch One, writtenness is doing little, 
if any, independent work.  Second, relying on the Founders’ argu-
ments from popular sovereignty and constraint is even more proble-
matic than relying on contemporary arguments of this sort because 
the Founders were operating in a very different legal, historical, and 
political context.  They were debating a new Constitution; contempo-
rary theorists are debating a very old one.  That means the most po-
werful objection to the popular sovereignty argument—the dead hand 
problem—was much less of an issue for the Founders than it is for 
contemporary originalists.  The Founders were also operating in a new 
 
37 Id. at 53. 
38 Id. at 49. 
39 Id. 
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nation at a time of severe political and social instability; contemporary 
theorists are operating in a comparatively stable and deeply rooted 
political and social order.  For this reason, fixed constitutional con-
straints probably seemed more pressing to the Founders than they do 
in today’s mature democracy, which has many other resources—legal 
and otherwise—for restraining abuses of government power.40 
In short, the perceived connection of writtenness to originalism in 
the Founding Era offers no compelling reason for believing that writ-
tenness entails originalism today.  It is either an argument from au-
thority based on the very authority it is supposed to justify—a classic 
case of bootstrapping—or it collapses into an even weaker version of 
Branch One.  Either way, writtenness alone tells contemporary judges 
nothing about which interpretive approach to adopt. 
2.  The Self-Interpreting Strain 
Another variant of Branch Two draws on the text of the Suprema-
cy and Oath Clauses of Article VI, along with the interpretive conven-
tions prevailing at the time of ratification, to argue that the written-
ness of the Constitution compels an originalist interpretive approach.  
This argument, advanced most forcefully by Michael Stokes Paulsen, is 
rather complex and therefore easiest to spell out in schematic form: 
1. The Supremacy Clause makes “[t]his Constitution”
41
 the “su-
preme Law of the Land.”
42
 
2. The Oath Clause of Article VI binds judges and other govern-
ment officials to support “[t]his Constitution.” 
3. The obvious referent of “[t]his Constitution” is the written con-
stitutional text drafted in 1787 and beginning, “We the 
People.”
43
 
4. When “[t]his Constitution” was ratified, written legal docu-
ments were presumptively interpreted according to their origi-
nal public meaning.
44
 
 
40 Cf. David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 
924 (1996) (“[O]nce a society develops political traditions, political actors can be more 
confident that their opponents, even if arguably departing from the text, will operate within 
the traditions, or will be reined in by other forces in society if they do not do so.”). 
41 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. pmbl. 
44 Paulsen leans heavily on Saikrishna Prakash for this point.  See Saikrishna B. 
Prakash, Unoriginalism’s Law Without Meaning, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 529, 540-46 (1998) 
(book review). 
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5. Ergo, the Constitution itself directs official modern interpreters 
to adopt an originalist interpretive approach.
45
 
Two things are worth noting about this argument.  First, the writ-
tenness of the Constitution—and not the specific language of Article 
VI—is doing nearly all of the work.  Indeed, Premises One and Two 
are mostly superfluous.  They lay the groundwork for a nice rhetorical 
flourish:  the Constitution itself prescribes an originalist interpretive 
approach!46  But whether or not Article VI purported to make the 
Constitution supreme and binding, it would still be a written docu-
ment and thus, under Premise Four, subject to originalist interpreta-
tion.  Conversely, without Premise Four and the argument from writ-
tenness, “[t]his Constitution” could be interpreted quite plausibly as 
denoting the constitutional text as interpreted under one of many 
nonoriginalist theories.47 
 
45 See Paulsen, supra note 8, at 868-69, 872-73. 
46 See id. at 858.  Paulsen argues that 
[a] careful reading of the text of the Constitution . . . shows that the Constitu-
tion does prescribe an interpretive methodology.  That methodology is to read 
and apply the document’s written words and phrases, taken in context, as they 
would have been understood by reasonably informed readers of such a docu-
ment at the time they were written. 
Id. 
47 It is an interesting puzzle whether a constitutional text (or any other text) can 
ever authoritatively supply the methodology for its own interpretation.  Imagine, for 
example, that Article VI contained a fourth section explicitly instructing judges and 
other officials to interpret the document according to its original public meaning.  
Would this resolve all doubt?  It would not.  (And not just because the new section 
would itself have to be interpreted.)  We can presume that an explicitly worded in-
struction of this sort—read in isolation—would have the same meaning under any 
plausible contemporary interpretive approach.  Nevertheless, a normative argument 
would still be required for adhering to this instruction in interpreting the rest of the 
Constitution.  Of course, the instruction itself would raise the costs of applying a non-
originalist interpretive approach to other provisions.  If judges (and other officials) 
could ignore this language, would any constitutional provision be safe?  But these costs 
could—at least in principle—be outweighed by the substantive unattractiveness of an 
originalist approach relative to plausible nonoriginalist alternatives (and to the alter-
native of scrapping the Constitution altogether).  If an originalist approach were suffi-
ciently unattractive substantively, but so was jettisoning the Constitution, the norma-
tively best option might be for judges to ignore even an explicit instruction to be 
originalists and instead apply some other interpretive approach to the remainder of 
the constitutional text.  It follows a fortiori that judges might be normatively justified 
in ignoring the implicit interpretive instructions Paulsen purports to find in Article VI, 
which, unlike an explicit instruction, simply disappear under a range of plausible non-
originalist interpretive approaches.  An important implication is that interpretive 
choice need not be all-or-nothing, pace many originalists.  See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, supra 
note 8, at 59 (making the all-or-nothing argument); Barnett, supra note 8, at 635-36 
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Second, the soundness of the argument depends crucially on an 
unstated premise:  namely, that interpretive conventions prevailing at 
the Founding should govern contemporary constitutional interpreta-
tion (most specifically, interpretation of Article VI).  It is tempting to 
reply that this is the exact question at issue between originalists and 
their opponents and therefore adds nothing to the originalist argu-
ment.  But that is not quite true.  One might still be an originalist 
without believing that Founding Era interpretive conventions are 
binding;48 conversely, one might still be a nonoriginalist while believ-
ing that they are (depending on one’s belief about the content of 
those conventions).49  Nevertheless, the contemporary authority of 
Founding Era interpretive conventions is too controversial to be simp-
ly asserted.  It requires affirmative justification. 
The arguments from popular sovereignty and constraint jump im-
mediately to mind as possibilities.  If we were concerned with  uphold-
ing the sovereignty of the ratifying generation, we might well be con-
cerned with preserving not only the meaning of the text that generation 
ratified but also that generation’s understanding of how that text would 
be interpreted.50  Similarly, if we were concerned with fixing a set of 
constraints on government authority at one point in time, it might well 
make sense to fix a method for interpreting the text in which the con-
straints were embodied.  But of course, either of these moves would col-
lapse the Self-Interpreting Strain into Branch One.  The argument 
from writtenness would then tell us no more or less about the proper 
interpretive approach than the controversial normative justifications 
from which its proponents have loudly declared their independence.  
Presumably, this is why Paulsen refuses to invoke popular sovereignty or 
constraint to support either the authority of Founding Era interpretive 
 
(same).  Both constitutional text and original meaning can be embraced in part or in 
whole, depending on the values that would be served thereby. 
48 See Barnett, supra note 8, at 612-13 (noting that contradiction of doing so is 
merely apparent). 
49 See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. 
REV. 885, 948 (1985) (arguing that the Founders themselves were not originalists in 
the intentionalist sense of originalism); Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness:  The 
Supreme Court and Gun Control, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 27, 2008, at 33 (arguing that the 
Framers never intended to bind future generations to original meaning).   
50 Cf. Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 
548-49 (2003) (suggesting that most originalists would agree “the meaning that they 
are committed to enforcing emerges from the application to the Constitution’s words 
of various legal and linguistic principles that reasonable members of the founding 
generation would have used to understand those words”). 
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conventions or original meaning more generally.  Indeed, he insistently 
refuses to supply any justification at all. 
He offers two explanations for this refusal.  The first is that his ap-
proach is no less circular than nonoriginalist approaches, which begin 
with a set of premises external to the Constitution and then reason 
from those premises to “the conclusion that this is the interpretive 
stance that the text (as viewed through such an external lens) in fact 
presupposes—or at least the one that makes for the ‘best’ interpreta-
tion of the text under that interpretive approach.”51  If true, this would 
indeed pose a serious dilemma.  But it plainly is not true.  To be sure, 
most nonoriginalist interpretive arguments—and many originalist 
ones—begin with premises outside the Constitution and reason from 
those principles to an interpretive approach that they proceed to ap-
ply to the constitutional text.  But in general, the premises they start 
with are normative principles openly defended on normative grounds.  
Originalist arguments from popular sovereignty and constraint are 
good examples of this form (and convenient since already discussed 
earlier in this Part).  They begin with political values, which they claim 
require an originalist interpretive approach, and they defend both the 
values themselves and the necessity of originalism to their practical 
realization.  There is certainly room for debate on both points, but 
there is no circularity involved.  Paulsen’s central premise, by contrast, 
is simply an assertion of authority (of original public meaning and 
Founding Era interpretive conventions) that is (a) basically synonym-
ous with his methodological conclusion and (b) totally disconnected 
from any affirmative claim of political morality.  This is the very es-
sence of bootstrapping. 
Paulsen’s second explanation is a sort of confession and avoid-
ance:  normative arguments may show that the Constitution is illegi-
timate, but once we accept the Constitution as binding law, no further 
argument is necessary.  Originalist interpretation simply follows as a 
matter of logical entailment.52  This argument and others like it will be 
discussed at some length in Part III.  For now, suffice it to say that its 
key move is a conflation of “the Constitution” with its original public 
meaning—in other words, the assumption of an originalist interpre-
tive approach—defended only by reference to Paulsen’s bootstrap-
ping first explanation.  Like the Hybrid Strain, then, the Self-
Interpreting Strain either collapses into Branch One or covertly as-
 
51 Paulsen, supra note 8, at 871. 
52 See id. at 875-76.  
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sumes its conclusion.  Either way, writtenness alone offers no compel-
ling reason for adopting an originalist interpretive approach. 
C.  Branch Three 
The third branch of the argument from writtenness is the most 
promising but also the most difficult to grasp.  Boiled down to essen-
tials, the idea is that an originalist interpretive approach is somehow 
part and parcel of—in fact, synonymous with—commitment to a writ-
ten constitution.  As Randy Barnett puts it, 
We are bound [to respect the original meaning of the text] because we 
today—right here, right now—profess our commitment to a written con-
stitution, and original meaning interpretation follows inexorably from that com-
mitment.  We can easily jettison that original meaning by disclaiming our 
commitment to a written constitution, but this is a choice both courts 
and scholars have been generally unwilling to make.
53
 
The claim is somewhat mysterious.  At first blush, it seems like just 
another bare assertion—and a peculiarly bare one at that.  After all, 
many nonoriginalists believe themselves committed to a written con-
stitution.  Surely, some argument is required to show that they are 
mistaken.  But this time originalists actually have arguments to offer. 
The two most common are unpersuasive reductios.  The first con-
tends that the only alternative to originalist interpretation of the con-
stitutional text is random semantic drift.  As Jack Balkin argues, “[I]f 
the dictionary definitions of words change[] over time, their legal ef-
fect [under a nonoriginalist approach] would also change, not be-
cause of any conscious act of lawmaking . . . but merely because of 
changes in language.”54  In this up-is-down, black-is-white world, legal 
change is completely haphazard.  The federal power to protect states 
against “domestic Violence,”55 for example, morphs from a power to 
suppress insurrection into a power to legislate against spousal abuse.56  
If this sort of thing were the inevitable consequence of nonoriginal-
 
53 Barnett, supra note 8, at 636 (emphasis added). 
54 Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 NW. U. L. 
REV. 549, 552 (2009); accord Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 8, at 1131 (“We therefore 
think that to avoid creeping or lurching anachronism infecting the interpretation of 
an authoritative legal text, the proper approach must be one of ‘originalist’ textual-
ism . . . .”); Paulsen, supra note 8, at 876 (“The alternative to fixed time-point meaning 
is to license pure linguistic anachronism.”). 
55 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
56 Balkin, supra note 54, at 552; see also Paulsen, supra note 8, at 877 (invoking the 
same example).  
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ism, that would surely be a strong point in originalism’s favor.  But this 
is simply not the case.  Indeed, the example is transparently silly.  
Nonoriginalism does entail that constitutional meaning will evolve 
over time, at least partly in conjunction with American linguistic prac-
tices.  But no responsible nonoriginalist advocates mechanical appli-
cation of new dictionary definitions where the context would make 
such application absurd. 
The second reductio contends—somewhat inconsistently—that the 
only alternative to originalist interpretation is radical subjectivity, with 
each interpreter free to supply her own idiosyncratic interpretation of 
the text.57  Here the relevant bogeyman is Humpty Dumpty, contemp-
tuously informing Alice that, “When I use a word, . . . it means just 
what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.”58  As with semantic 
drift, if this were an accurate portrait of nonoriginalism, that would 
surely count as a strong point in originalism’s favor.  But the portrait 
is not accurate.  In fact, it is just as fanciful as the “domestic Violence” 
example.  To be sure, a tiny and rapidly shrinking minority of nonori-
ginalists do subscribe to radical subjectivism.59  But this view is clearly 
not a necessary entailment of nonoriginalism.  Indeed, it is far outside 
the mainstream.  The interpretive principles favored by most nonori-
ginalists—contemporary values, representation reinforcement, eco-
nomic efficiency, and so forth—are every bit as objective, in the sense 
of observer independent, as original meaning.  This is not to suggest 
that these principles render the observer irrelevant.  Occasional bad 
faith and more than occasional cognitive bias mean different judges 
will come to different conclusions about what result is most consistent 
with contemporary values or best serves economic efficiency.  But the 
same is true of original meaning. 
The reductios, then, are false starts, but they are not a total failure.  
It is possible to reconstruct from them—along with other originalist 
arguments from writtenness—a far more plausible version of Branch 
 
57 The inconsistency is that semantic drift and radical subjectivity cannot both be 
the only alternative to originalism. 
58 LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS AND WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE 
124 (MacMillan Co. 1928) (1898) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Paulsen, 
supra note 8, at 870 (invoking the Humpty Dumpty example). 
59 Most of these view objectivity in general (including the objectivity of original 
meaning) as a sham.  See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REA-
SON 36-37 (1997) (discussing the view that “objectivity and neutrality are merely shams 
concealing a dominance game”); Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. 
L. REV. 1151, 1214 (1985) (“[Socially created] metaphors constructed the ‘reality’ that 
within the legal discourse was supposed to exist out there, in social relations themselves.”). 
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Three.  Though unpersuasive on their own terms, the reductios do 
plausibly associate writtenness with legal objectivity and entrenchment 
of constitutional meaning against change.  In a similar vein, Branches 
One and Two—while failing to provide a truly independent argument 
from writtenness—plausibly associate writtenness with popular sove-
reignty and the need to constrain official power.  None of these asso-
ciations establishes that originalism follows deductively from a com-
mitment to a written constitution.  But taken together, they do 
demonstrate that originalism is capable of plausibly explaining the 
decision to treat a written constitutional text as authoritative over 
time.  That is the first step in developing a strong version of the argu-
ment from writtenness. 
The second step is to establish that no other interpretive approach 
is similarly capable.  This claim is a strong one but slightly more mod-
est than the reductios.  It stops short of insisting that nonoriginalism 
leads inevitably to semantic drift or radical subjectivity.  Rather, it con-
tends that, unlike originalism, nonoriginalist interpretive methods 
bear no intelligible relation to the written text and can offer no satis-
factory explanation of our continued commitment to it.  If judges are 
to employ such methods, we may as well have an unwritten constitu-
tion.  This is what Keith Whittington seems to have in mind when he 
writes that, “[u]nlike other approaches, an originalist interpretive me-
thod accounts for significant features of our particular constitutional 
tradition:  the existence of a written constitution and a judiciary 
committed to interpreting that text.  Only an originalist judiciary is 
consistent with the constitutional project that we claim to be pur-
suing.”60  Restated to emphasize its two key elements, this version of 
Branch Three claims (1) that originalism can successfully explain our 
continued commitment to a written constitutional text and (2) that 
no other approach can. 
There are three things worth noting about this argument.  First, if it 
is correct, originalism really does follow from our commitment to a 
written constitution, without the aid of other controversial normative 
premises.  This version of Branch Three is thus independent of other 
normative justifications in just the sense that Branch One is not.  
 
60 WHITTINGTON, supra note 8, at 61; see also Paulsen, supra note 8, at 871 (“[Non-
originalism] severs interpretive premises and principles from the text being inter-
preted.  This is a problem for an enterprise that is seeking to interpret the Constitu-
tion in order to apply it as exclusive authoritative, binding law.  The more an 
interpretive approach is disconnected from the text, the more it is disconnected from 
the text’s authority.”). 
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Second, while the argument does take commitment to a written consti-
tution as given, that commitment is shared widely enough that Branch 
Three has the potential to persuade a very broad audience, if not every-
one.61  It thus cannot be dismissed as question begging in the sense that 
Branch Two could be.  For these reasons, Branch Three represents the 
last, best hope for the originalist argument from writtenness.  Alas, 
there is a rub, and this is the final thing to note about Branch Three:  it 
depends crucially on the extremely demanding claim that originalism is 
the only way to make sense of our commitment to a written constitution.  
In other words, the one plausible form of the argument from written-
ness can successfully justify originalism only if there is no other way to 
explain our ongoing commitment to the constitutional text.62  That is a 
very tall order, as the next Part demonstrates. 
 
61 What Henry Monaghan wrote three decades ago remains largely true today:  
“The authoritative status of the written constitution is . . . an incontestable first prin-
ciple for theorizing about American constitutional law.”  Henry P. Monaghan, Our Per-
fect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 383 (1981).  But see Grey, supra note 14, at 717 
(arguing that the United States functionally has an unwritten constitution); Young, 
supra note 14, at 411 (same).  Still, originalist proponents of Branch Three ignore an 
important possibility:  that commitment to a written constitution is nearly universal 
only because such commitment is perceived as consistent with a wide range of inter-
pretive approaches.  If originalists succeed in exploding this perception, the result may 
well be reduced—perhaps substantially reduced—support for written constitutional-
ism.  Cf. LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETTLED CONSTITUTION 210-16 (2001) 
(identifying the distinctive genius of the U.S. Constitution as its ability to accommo-
date—even nurture—widely divergent views); Todd E. Pettys, The Myth of the Written 
Constitution, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 991, 1045-47 (2009) (describing the power of the 
idea of a written constitution to unify persons of widely divergent substantive views).  
Instead of prompting conversion to originalism, the argument from writtenness might 
serve in effect as a reductio demonstrating the absurdity of treating the constitutional 
text as binding law over time.  This possibility would arise, however, only if originalists 
were correct that nonoriginalism and commitment to a written constitution are mu-
tually exclusive.  As Part II explains, they are not.   
62 It is possible to imagine a more modest version of this claim, but on close ex-
amination, it is apparent why no prominent originalist has advocated it.  This version 
would hold that, even if originalism is not the only way to make sense of our commit-
ment to a written constitution, it is the best way in some relevant sense of “best.”  What 
that sense might be is unclear, however.  If the point is that originalism is normatively 
best among the plausible contenders, this argument would appear to land originalists 
right back in the protracted normative debate from which the argument from written-
ness was supposed to rescue them.  Alternatively, originalism might be thought to best 
accord with some conceptual notion of writtenness, but if it is not the only way to make 
sense of our commitment to a written constitution, originalists would have to explain 
why the marginal advantage of originalism on this dimension outweighs the (poten-
tial) advantages of competing theories on other normative dimensions.  This, too, 
would destroy the capacity of the argument from writtenness to function as a trump card. 
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II.  THE MANY USES OF WRITTENNESS 
Randy Barnett concludes his argument from writtenness with a 
challenge:  “[T]hose who would deviate from [the original meaning 
of] the written constitution . . . have to explain why we bother to keep 
it around . . . .”63  This Part takes up the gauntlet.  More precisely, this 
Part shows that even Branch Three—the strongest form of the argu-
ment from writtenness—fails because originalism is not the only way 
to explain why we bother to keep the written constitution around.  To 
the contrary, one can be committed to a written constitution in many 
ways and for many reasons, most of which do not entail an originalist 
interpretive approach.  For example, one might be committed to a 
written constitution as a focal point for legal coordination in the 
manner of the rules of the road; as a flexible framework for common 
law elaboration; as a locus of normative discourse in a flourishing con-
stitutional culture; or as one of many legitimate ingredients in a plu-
ralist practice of constitutional adjudication.  This Part explores each 
of these possibilities by way of illustration.  The goal is not to illumi-
nate all of their finer points or to defend them on the merits.  It is 
merely to show that each accords the written text an important role in 
constitutional interpretation and does not entail any form of original-
ism.  If this is true, the argument from writtenness fails.64  The Part 
concludes with a brief discussion of nonoriginalist interpretive prac-
tices in other countries, which render even more implausible the no-
 
63 Barnett, supra note 8, at 653-54. 
64 Although conceived independently, this argument owes a debt to the thoughtful 
discussion in Primus, supra note 10, at 178-79.  Aside from its brevity, however, that dis-
cussion differs from this one in several important respects.  First, Primus does not dis-
tinguish between Branch Three and other versions of the argument from writtenness.  
As Part I shows, those versions suffer from their own shortcomings, but the critique 
advanced in this Part applies only to Branch Three.  Second, Primus simply assumes 
that the nonoriginalist approaches he discusses (some of which are also discussed in 
this Part) are meaningfully committed to a written constitution.  In fact, the relation-
ship between those approaches and the written constitution is both subtle and com-
plex, as this Part explains at length.  Neither the existence nor the nature of that rela-
tionship (nor the distinctness of these approaches from originalism) can be treated as 
self-evident.  Third, Primus understands originalist arguments from writtenness as 
primarily focused on the nature of constitutionalism rather than the nature of written-
ness.  This conflates Branch One, which is focused on the purposes of constitutional-
ism, and Branch Three, which is very much focused on writtenness.  As a result, Primus 
never undertakes the crucial task of explaining the consistency between a broad range 
of nonoriginalist approaches and commitment to a written constitution.  That task is 
the central focus of this Part.  None of this, it bears emphasis, is a knock on Primus, 
whose brief discussion of these issues makes no attempt to provide the kind of sus-
tained critique this Article does. 
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tion that originalism is the only recognizable form of commitment to 
a written constitution. 
A.  Conventionalism 
One familiar nonoriginalist reason for embracing a written consti-
tution is that the text serves as a focal point for legal coordination.  
Generally known as conventionalism, this approach builds on the in-
sight that it is more important for many issues to be settled than to be 
settled right.65  Sometimes settlement is the only important goal.  No 
one cares if cars drive on the right or left side of the road, so long as 
the rule is clear and consistently followed.  More often, different 
groups prefer different rules, but most or all prefer a settled rule to 
the uncertainty and waste of resources associated with fighting for 
their own favored alternatives.  Most Americans probably do not think 
that thirty-five is the optimal minimum age for presidential eligibility, 
but few would think it worth the risk or effort of pressing for their pre-
ferred alternative.  Having a settled rule is too important relative to 
the puny benefits of getting the minimum age exactly right.  The ob-
vious problem in such cases is how to decide which rule to settle on, 
when everyone has different ideas about which rule is best.  That is 
where focal points come in.  When different parties disagree but nev-
ertheless wish to cooperate, game theory shows that it is useful to have 
highly salient, clear-cut rules close at hand.  So long as these rules are 
substantively good enough—or at least better than no rule at all—the 
parties will often converge on them as ready-made solutions, or focal 
points, for resolving their disagreement.66 
The central claim of conventionalism is that the constitutional 
text is binding because it serves as a focal point in this sense.  For cul-
tural and historical reasons, the text is a highly salient source of legal 
norms; American lawyers, judges, politicians, and citizens all turn to it 
by second nature as a source for resolving constitutional disputes.  It is 
also relatively clear-cut in the sense of having readily identifiable 
boundaries.  With trivial exceptions, everyone agrees what sequence of 
words and punctuation makes up the authoritative constitutional text.  
Finally, “[p]eople who disagree about a constitutional question will 
 
65 Cf. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (“[I]n most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be 
settled than that it be settled right.”). 
66 See generally THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 58-80 (paper-
back ed. 1980). 
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often find that although few or none of them thinks the answer pro-
vided by the text of the Constitution is optimal . . . all of them can live 
with the limits that the text imposes.”67  For these reasons, conventio-
nalists argue, “the Constitution is a particularly good focal point” and 
should be interpreted to preserve its ability to function as such.68  Most 
centrally, this means a court must always be able to plausibly say that 
its constitutional interpretations honor the text. 
This approach plainly accords the written text of the Constitution 
an important role, but what exactly it understands “the text” to mean 
requires more explanation.  The short answer is that the text refers to 
the full range of meanings present-day Americans might plausibly un-
derstand its written words to convey, including but not limited to orig-
inal public meaning, the intended meaning of the Framers and Ratifi-
ers, contemporary public meaning, and glosses attached to the text by 
history and tradition.  For some provisions, these meanings will con-
verge in a single, quite determinate rule.  The thirty-five-year mini-
mum age for presidential eligibility has only one plausible meaning, at 
least for now, as does the language of Article I, Section 3, granting 
each state two seats in the Senate.69  Other provisions will be subject to 
a range of plausible interpretations.  The Sixth Amendment right of 
the accused “to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence”70 
might plausibly be interpreted to confer a right to court-appointed 
counsel, as the Supreme Court interpreted it to do in Gideon v. Wain-
wright.71  But it might also be understood merely to bar government 
interference with a criminal defendant’s efforts to retain private coun-
sel, as it apparently was understood at the Founding.72  In such cases, 
the text will merely narrow, not fully resolve, interpretive disagree-
ments.  But that is hardly insignificant.  All else equal, less disagree-
ment is generally preferable to more. 
Originalists might object that original meaning would be a more 
effective focal point than the permissive conventionalist understand-
ing of the text.  After all, there is only one original meaning (though 
it may be vague or equivocal) and a whole range of “plausible” mean-
 
67 David A. Strauss, Essay, Common Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson’s Principle, 
112 YALE L.J. 1717, 1733 (2003). 
68 Id. at 1734. 
69 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3 (“The Senate of the United States shall be composed of 
two Senators from each state . . . .”). 
70 Id. amend. VI. 
71 See 372 U.S. 335, 339-41 (1963). 
72 See Strauss, supra note 40, at 919-20 (discussing the right-to-counsel example). 
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ings on the conventionalist account.  This is probably wrong, however, 
for reasons David Strauss explains.  Unlike the constitutional text of 
the conventionalists, whose outer limits are the subject of general 
agreement,73 original meanings are often quite difficult to ascertain 
and have little salience even for most lawyers, much less for the gener-
al public.  There is also no broad consensus that constitutional inter-
pretations must track original meaning comparable to the general 
agreement that they must track the text.  In most instances, therefore, 
original meaning is a comparatively unpromising focal point.74  More 
important for present purposes, this objection to conventionalism is 
not an argument from writtenness.  Rather, it is an argument that ori-
ginalism serves some extrinsic instrumental goal—the reduction of 
constitutional conflict—better than another form of commitment to a 
written constitution.  Even if true, the normative force of this claim 
would turn on the usefulness of original meaning as a focal point, not 
on the writtenness of the Constitution. 
More ambitiously, originalists might object that it is impossible for 
a conventionalist text to serve as a focal point because the number of 
plausible alternative meanings is essentially infinite.  This variant of 
the Humpty Dumpty reductio75 denies not only the desirability of con-
ventionalism but also its coherence.  If true, it would therefore sup-
port the Branch Three claim that originalism is the only plausible 
form of commitment to a written constitution.  It is quite plainly not 
true, however.  Social, legal, and linguistic conventions prevent the 
constitutional text from being plausibly interpreted to mean just any-
thing at all.76  Some provisions, like the age limits and two-senator lan-
guage of Article I, Section 3 clearly have only one plausible meaning.77  
Others admit to a range of interpretations but narrow the range of 
 
73 Cf. Frederick Schauer, An Essay on Constitutional Language, 29 UCLA L. REV. 797, 
828 (1982) (“[W]e might do best to look at constitutional language as a frame without 
a picture, or, better yet, a blank canvas.  We know when we have gone off the edge of 
the canvas even though the canvas itself gives us no guidance as to what to put on it.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
74 See Strauss, supra note 67, at 1745. 
75 See supra text accompanying note 58. 
76 Exactly what these conventions are, where they come from, and how they interact 
are complicated and poorly understood questions.  See Richard Primus, Constitutional Ex-
pectations, NEW REPUBLIC (forthcoming 2010) (offering a thoughtful preliminary take on 
these questions).  But that they do in fact constrain the range of textual meanings recog-
nized as plausible is demonstrated by the examples that follow in the main text.  Cf. 
Strauss, supra note 40, at 911-12 (discussing the role of background understandings in 
determining the conventionalist meaning of the constitutional text). 
77 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3. 
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plausible disagreement in important ways.  The Sixth Amendment 
right of the accused “to have the Assistance of Counsel for his de-
fence”78 may or may not require the government to provide defense 
counsel for indigents.  But it plainly does not include the right to a 
court-appointed lawyer to draft a will or assist in the sale of a home.  
Similarly, the natural-born-citizen rule79 may or may not exclude per-
sons like Senator John McCain from the presidency.80  But it plainly 
does exclude Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger.81 
Even the most open-ended provisions of the constitutional text, 
like the Privileges or Immunities and Equal Protection Clauses, im-
pose some limits.  Neither, for example, could plausibly be inter-
preted to mandate a unicameral national legislature, a parliamentary 
system, or direct election of the Secretary of State.  Within such limits, 
however, conventionalists are happy to concede that many disagree-
ments are not susceptible to resolution by coordination around a focal 
point, because it is more important that they be settled right than that 
they be settled definitively.82  So long as the capacious limits of the text 
are observed, this process need not diminish the ability of the text to 
serve as a focal point for other issues where settlement is the predo-
minant consideration. 
The key point is that conventionalism provides a coherent and 
plausible nonoriginalist rationale for taking the written constitutional 
text seriously.  It may or may not be normatively defensible on other 
grounds.  Perhaps it overvalues settlement or exaggerates the degree 
of settlement that a nonoriginalist understanding of the text can pro-
mote.  Perhaps it underestimates the potential of original meanings to 
serve as useful focal points.  But these are not arguments from writ-
 
78 Id. amend. VI. 
79 See id. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (“No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a citizen of 
the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to 
the Office of President . . . .”). 
80 Compare Gabriel J. Chin, Why Senator John McCain Cannot Be President:  Eleven 
Months and a Hundred Yards Short of Citizenship, 107 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 1, 
2 (2008), with Stephen E. Sachs, Commentary, Why John McCain Was a Citizen at Birth, 
107 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 49, 49 (2008). 
81 Schwarzenegger is a naturalized citizen.  See Arnold Schwarzenegger, Arnold 
Schwarzenegger Recalls Lessons from 25 Years as a U.S. Citizen—Learn English, Participate in Pol-
itics, and Give Back, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 17, 2008, http:// 
www.usnews.com/articles/opinion/2008/09/17/arnold-schwarzenegger-recalls-lessons-
from-25-years-as-a-us-citizen--learn-english-participate-in-politics-and-give-back.html. 
82 See Strauss, supra note 67, at 1743-44. 
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tenness.83  Conventionalism may or may not be the best interpretive 
approach, but it is undeniably committed to a written constitution. 
B.  Common Law Constitutionalism 
Another familiar nonoriginalist form of commitment to a written 
constitution is common law constitutionalism.  Closely related to con-
ventionalism, this approach understands the constitutional text as a 
framework for common law elaboration in two distinct but interre-
lated senses.  First, the constitutional text provides an institutional 
framework in which the elaboration of substantive constitutional prin-
ciples can take place gradually over time in the common law fashion.  
This framework includes not only courts, which elaborate constitu-
tional principles explicitly, but also legislatures and executive offi-
cials—at both the federal and state levels—whose practices inform, 
catalyze, and serve as a counterweight to judicial interpretations.84  
Second, the constitutional text provides a framework of substantive 
rules such as freedom of expression, the prohibition of cruel and un-
usual punishment, and equal protection of the laws, which it charges 
the institutional framework with elaborating.  Together, common law 
constitutionalists contend, these frameworks serve to aggregate the 
wisdom of previous generations and to ensure a substantial measure 
of stability in our basic governmental arrangements.85  At the same 
time, and what is equally important, the frameworks also facilitate in-
cremental (and occasionally drastic) constitutional change short of 
formal amendment to meet the needs of a constantly evolving society.  
This change occurs both within the frameworks and through common 
law evolution of the frameworks themselves. 
How exactly this process functions is a question of considerable 
complexity, but, like conventionalism, it accords an important role to 
the written Constitution.  That role is different, however, with respect to 
common law evolution inside the textual frameworks and evolution of 
 
83 More precisely, they are not arguments in which the writtenness of the Constitu-
tion—as opposed to the normative desirability of alternatives to originalism—is doing 
the relevant work. 
84 On the importance of nonjudicial precedents in the development of constitu-
tional law, see Berman, supra note 10, at 34-36; Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft 
Law:  Lessons from Congressional Practice, 61 STAN. L. REV. 573, 623 (2008); and Eric A. 
Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Showdowns, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 991, 999 (2008). 
85 On the stabilizing effects of common law constitutional interpretation, see 
Thomas W. Merrill, Bork v. Burke, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 509, 512-13 (1996), and 
Merrill, supra note 30, at 274-81. 
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the frameworks themselves.  As to the former, common law constitu-
tional interpretation is strongly constrained by the plausible range of 
present-day meanings attributable to the text.86  In this sense, common 
law constitutionalism complements the conventionalist account of the 
text as a focal point.  It comes into play when the text narrows, but does 
not resolve, interpretive disagreement.  (This is true most of the time, 
but to widely varying degrees, depending on the text in question.)  
Within the range of disagreement permitted by the text, both courts 
and other institutions tend to accord considerable deference to well-
established practices, especially those which “have been tested over 
time, in a variety of circumstances, and have been found to be at least 
good enough.”87  Of course, these institutions also sometimes depart 
from traditional practices determined to be unjust or out of step with 
present needs.  But they typically do so incrementally, in common law 
fashion, and only after due consideration for “the presumption normal-
ly given to things that have worked well enough for a long time.”88 
For the most part, this is how common law constitutionalism op-
erates:  within the constraints of the conventionalist text.  Occasional-
ly, however, it also operates as one mechanism through which the 
content of those constraints evolves.89  This generally occurs when 
courts or other institutions stretch the plausible linguistic meaning of 
the text, either to meet a new social need or to better comport with 
longstanding practice.90  Examples are bound to be controversial, but 
might plausibly include the Fourth Amendment warrant require-
ment91 and the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III standing,92 
both of which the Supreme Court seems to have adopted against the 
grain of contemporaneous understandings of the text.  Conventional-
ism ensures that such moves succeed only rarely.  But when they do, 
the new meaning becomes part of the conventionalist text constrain-
 
86 See Strauss, supra note 40, at 899 (“[I]t is no part of our practice ever to ‘over-
rule’ a textual provision.”).  
87 Id. at 892. 
88 Id. at 895. 
89 Others include linguistic change, academic commentary, political leadership, 
and social activism.  Cf. id. at 911-12. 
90 See id. at 898; Strauss, supra note 67, at 1750-51. 
91 See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 
757-58 (1994) (noting the inconsistency between the warrant requirement and the 
constitutional text as it was traditionally understood). 
92 See William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 224-25 (1988) 
(noting the historical novelty of the injury-in-fact rule as an interpretation of the Ar-
ticle III “case or controversy” requirement); Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lu-
jan?  Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 168-97 (1992) (same). 
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ing future interpretations, as it has in the Fourth Amendment and Ar-
ticle III contexts.  At the extreme, a common law constitutional inter-
pretation may become so successful that it renders implausible most 
or all other meanings of the text, including those that were previously 
well within the mainstream.  Again, examples will be controversial, but 
one possibility is the application of the Equal Protection Clause to ra-
cial discrimination in jury selection, which now seems virtually unas-
sailable despite strong evidence that the Fourteenth Amendment was 
not originally understood to apply to jury service.93  It is in examples 
like these that the textual frameworks for common law constitutional-
ism can themselves be said to evolve through a common law process. 
The important point is that the pace and frequency of this evolu-
tion are substantially constrained by the strong conventionalist role of 
the text.  At the same time, common law constitutionalism serves as 
one important factor in shaping the content of conventionalist under-
standings.  In these respects, it is clearly consistent with a conventio-
nalist commitment to the constitutional text.  No more is necessary to 
refute the originalist argument from writtenness, which requires af-
firmative inconsistency.  But the point can and should be made even 
stronger.  Common law constitutionalism is not merely reconcilable 
with writtenness; the writtenness of the Constitution actually advances 
the goals of common law constitutionalism in two important and fre-
quently overlooked ways. 
First, the existence of a written constitutional text, whose plausible 
range of interpretations is limited at any given time and changes only 
gradually, helps ensure the baseline of legal stability necessary to 
make common law innovation attractive.  This is related to but distinct 
from the conventionalist function of the text, which emphasizes its 
synchronic value in facilitating coordination at any given moment.  
Common law constitutionalism, by contrast, emphasizes the text’s di-
achronic value as a brake on the rate of common law change, which 
can proceed no faster (or more broadly) than the rate of change in 
the text’s plausible range of meanings.94  Put simply, conventionalism 
 
93 See generally Vikram David Amar, Jury Service as Political Participation Akin to Voting, 
80 CORNELL L. REV. 203, 204-05 (1995) (arguing that “jury service . . . was conceived of 
as a political right” and therefore not covered by the Fourteenth Amendment at the 
time of its ratification). 
94 In practice, this diachronic stability probably also enhances the text’s utility as a 
focal point for legal coordination.  In theory, however, coordination merely requires a 
high degree of synchronic salience.  A diachronically unstable text that remained high-
ly salient in a synchronic sense would still be a valuable focal point. 
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is primarily concerned with cooperation, common law constitutional-
ism with long-term planning.  The written text facilitates both. 
Second, and relatedly, the association of a particular common law 
interpretation with the written text can make that interpretation more 
durable than it would have been otherwise.  Over time, the interpreta-
tion serves to shape the meaning of the text, and the salience of the text 
serves to reinforce the interpretation.  The effect can be especially po-
werful if the interpretation resonates strongly with ordinary contempo-
rary understandings of the text.  Take the constitutional prohibition 
against gender discrimination—a classic common law innovation.95  
One reason that prohibition is more secure than, say, the right to abor-
tion is its now-close linkage in the public mind with the text of the 
Equal Protection Clause.  The same goes for the jury-selection and war-
rant-requirement examples discussed earlier.96  In this way, the written 
Constitution plays a vital role in common law constitutionalism. 
This claim may seem puzzling given that David Strauss, the most 
influential proponent of common law constitutionalism, has so fre-
quently cast it as the opposite of written constitutionalism.97  But the 
puzzle is mostly superficial.  Partly, it is a product of Strauss’s occa-
sional tendency to conflate the written Constitution with its original 
meaning.  Many of his attempts to downplay the significance of the 
former are in fact addressed primarily or exclusively to the latter.98  
 
95 Witness the gradual development of sex discrimination doctrine in Reed v. Reed, 404 
U.S. 71, 74-77 (1971); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682-88 (1973); Craig v. Boren, 
429 U.S. 190, 197-99 (1976); and United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531-34 (1996). 
96 Of course, the warrant requirement has been under steady assault for some 
time.  See Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 
547, 733-34 (1999).  But for now it survives, see Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1721 
(2009), and its survival for more than half a century almost certainly owes something to 
the appearance of the word “warrant” in the constitutional text.  See Strauss, supra note 
67, at 1725-26. 
97 See Strauss, supra note 67, at 1726-32 (explaining that the text of the Constitu-
tion “plays essentially no operative role in deciding the most controversial constitu-
tional questions,” which are resolved primarily by analysis of precedent); Strauss, supra 
note 40, at 885-86 (arguing that the common law, not the constitutional text, “provides 
the best way to understand the practices of American constitutional law”); David A. 
Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457, 1504-05 
(2001) (indicating that formal textual amendment plays only an incidental role in the 
evolution of the constitutional order); see also Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The 
Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 33-36 (1998) (making a parallel point in 
developing their quite similar notion of a “sedimentary constitution”). 
98 See Strauss, supra note 67, at 1721-22 (invoking Thomas Jefferson’s argument 
that one generation has no right to bind another as a challenge to the idea of written 
constitutionalism); Strauss, supra note 40, at 880, 904, 917 (“Following a written consti-
tution means accepting the judgments of people who lived centuries ago in a society 
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The puzzle is also partly a product of Strauss’s focus on individual liti-
gated cases.  He is obviously correct in observing that the great bulk of 
these are decided under judge-made doctrines without strong groun-
ding in the constitutional text.  But this observation is perfectly consis-
tent with the notion of the text as a framework shaping and channe-
ling the development of doctrine at the margins (as well as 
constitutional law outside the courts).  Indeed, that notion is essential-
ly the one Strauss himself advocates under the heading of conventio-
nalism.99  Finally, Strauss’s skeptical statements about the written Con-
stitution are completely consistent with the notion that the text 
provides an institutional framework within which both courts and 
other actors can shape constitutional meaning over time.  To the ex-
tent that his rhetoric outruns these explanations, it is best interpreted 
as a corrective to the conventionally exaggerated dichotomy between 
written and unwritten constitutions, which, despite their significant 
differences, share many common elements.100 
Another puzzle—this one cutting in the opposite direction—is the 
strong resemblance between common law constitutionalism and some 
versions of originalism.  The most obvious parallel is to Jack Balkin’s 
“framework originalism,” which regards the central purpose of the 
Constitution as “setting up a basic structure for government, making 
politics possible, and creating a framework for future constitutional 
construction.”101  This sounds a lot like common law constitutionalism.  
As such, it raises an important question:  does a common law constitu-
tionalist commitment to the text as framework require the embrace of 
at least a weak version of originalism?  Balkin seems to think it does.  
Under his approach, the Constitution’s original meaning serves as the 
framework, with something like common law constitutional “construc-
tion” filling in the gaps, embellishing, and resolving difficult questions 
of application.  To be sure, Balkin thinks that original meaning leaves 
 
that was very different from ours.”); Strauss, supra note 97, at 1464-65 (questioning the 
conception of a written constitutional amendment as a “decisive act by the people”). 
99 See Strauss, supra note 67, at 1731-40 (maintaining that all constitutional prin-
ciples must at least superficially flow from the text of the Constitution); Strauss, supra 
note 40, at 906-24 (“[I]n some way or another, however creative the interpretation, the 
text must be respected.”). 
100 Cf. Strauss, supra note 40, at 890 (contrasting commonalities between the U.S. 
Constitution and the unwritten British Constitution with differences between the writ-
ten constitutions of the United States and the written constitutions of other nations); 
id. (“The common law approach to constitutional interpretation . . . reduces (although 
it does not eliminate) the distinction between written and unwritten constitu-
tions . . . .”). 
101 Balkin, supra note 54, at 549-50. 
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ample room for such construction.  Indeed, he celebrates this fact as 
central to the Constitution’s democratic legitimacy.  Nevertheless, in 
his view, constitutional construction “must always remain faithful to 
the basic framework,” as defined by the text and its original mean-
ing.102  If this were true, common law constitutionalism would weakly 
support, rather than refute, the originalist argument from writtenness. 
It is not true.  Balkin’s approach illustrates one plausible way in 
which the text might serve as a framework for constitutional construc-
tion, common law or otherwise.  But it is not the only way.  The plau-
sibility of Balkin’s claim to exclusivity comes from our tendency to 
think of a framework as something fixed.  And indeed, in both consti-
tutions and buildings, frameworks need to possess a substantial meas-
ure of stability to perform their function.  But they do not need to be 
fixed irrevocably—or what amounts to almost the same thing, to be 
fixed except as against prohibitively onerous overhaul such as an Ar-
ticle V amendment.  Rather, the elements of a framework may them-
selves benefit from repair or replacement over time.  A joist may rot; a 
truss may bow.  Similarly, the textual framework for common law con-
stitutionalism may become ill adapted to contemporary needs.  So 
long as the framework does not change too often—or, more impor-
tant, all at once—it is still performing important structural work.103  It 
does this in part by constraining the options of future tinkerers, who 
can repair or replace its elements but cannot substitute a wet bar for a 
joist or a right to bet on college sports for the Fourth Amendment. 
The distinction between construction within a framework and al-
teration of that framework is unquestionably hazy.  Doubtless, Balkin’s 
permissive conception of original meaning would put most common 
law constitutional innovation on the construction, rather than the al-
teration, side of the line.  In fact, that seems to be the central point of 
 
102 Id. at 550. 
103 There is a parallel to the Ship of Theseus paradox, which poses the question 
whether a ship whose planks have all been replaced (in some versions multiple times) 
can remain the same ship.  See 1 PLUTARCH, The Life of Theseus, in LIVES 55 ( John Dryden 
trans., Edinburgh, A. Donaldson & J. Reid 1763).  For practical purposes, however, it 
hardly matters whether the rebuilt ship is “the same” in some rarefied philosophical 
sense.  What matters is that it floats.  Similarly, it is for practical purposes irrelevant 
whether an evolving constitution is the “same” constitution in some philosophical sense.  
What matters is that the written document plays an important functional role—
channeling, facilitating, constituting—that does not depend on a wholly, or even a par-
tially, originalist approach.  Cf. Schauer, supra note 73, at 829 (“With constitutional lan-
guage, so long as the enterprise stays afloat it is no objection that the current conception 
bears no close relation to the ordinary language meaning of the text.  If we have moved 
in small steps from the original text, the enterprise stays afloat.” (footnote omitted)). 
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his take on originalism.104  But even a loosey-goosey originalist like 
Balkin has to admit that common law constitutional change can alter, 
as well as construct, the framework supplied by original meaning.  
And if that is true, it is possible to be a common law constitutionalist 
without endorsing any version of originalism.  The clearest examples 
involve evolution in the meaning of legal terms of art, which, if origi-
nally understood as such, Balkin insists must retain their original 
technical meanings.105  Suppose the words “freedom of speech” in the 
First Amendment were originally understood as a term of art banning 
prior restraints (and only prior restraints) on speech.106  Later expan-
sions of their meaning through common law interpretation would 
then represent an alteration of the constitutional framework as Balkin 
conceives it.  Alternatively, and more plausibly, suppose the words 
“cases” and “controversies” in Article III107 were originally understood 
as terms of art requiring that federal plaintiffs possess a cause of ac-
tion.108  Their later interpretation to require injury in fact, causation, 
and redressability109 would then represent a common law alteration to 
original meaning rather than a Balkinian construction.  So long as 
these examples are consistent with a view of the text as a framework 
for common law development—and they plainly are—there is no logi-
cal imperative that common law constitutionalists embrace even Bal-
kin’s weak version of originalism. 
None of this is to suggest that common law constitutionalism is 
normatively superior to Balkin’s approach or indeed to any other ver-
sion of originalism.  Perhaps the evolving framework it embraces pro-
 
104 See Balkin, supra note 54, at 598.  Despite his professed conversion to original-
ism, Balkin’s recent series of articles on the subject seems far more concerned with—
and is far more successful at—demonstrating the compatibility of originalism and liv-
ing constitutionalism than in making an affirmative case for the former.  This compa-
tibility thesis is an important contribution, though one with notable antecedents.  See 
Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 115 (Amy Gutmann ed., 
1997); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1170-73 (1993).  
Happily, it is a contribution wholly unaffected by the failure of the argument from 
writtenness. 
105 See Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, supra note 8, at 304-05; Balkin, Origi-
nal Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, supra note 8, at 491-92. 
106 Cf. LEONARD W. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION:  FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS 
IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY 182-236 (1960) (defending this interpretation).  Of 
course, Levy later retracted this view under heavy criticism, see LEONARD W. LEVY, 
EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS, at i-xix (1985), but that does not affect its illustrative force. 
107 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
108 See Fletcher, supra note 92, at 224-25 (making this claim); Sunstein, supra note 
92, at 168-69 (same). 
109 See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). 
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vides too little stability for effective governance or private planning.  
Or perhaps its devotion to precedent places too heavy a thumb on the 
scale in favor of past practices.110  Perhaps it is undemocratic in depart-
ing from the constitutional meanings ratified by the people.111  Or 
perhaps it is too susceptible to the shifting sands of popular opinion.112  
The important point is that common law constitutionalism provides a 
coherent and plausible nonoriginalist rationale for taking the consti-
tutional text seriously.  That is enough to doom the originalist argu-
ment from writtenness. 
C.  Constitutional Culture 
Yet another nonoriginalist form of commitment to a written con-
stitution is popular or democratic constitutionalism.  The idea here is 
that the Constitution emanates from the people and retains its legiti-
macy only to the extent that they continue to accept it as their own.  
On this view, the text serves as a locus of normative discourse in an ac-
tive and evolving constitutional culture, which both informs and con-
strains the development of constitutional law in the courts.  Its role is 
not to fix constitutional meaning at one point in time but to supply a 
set of institutions, principles, and above all a language or discourse, 
which the people can use to shape and reshape their constitutional 
commitments over time.  As Reva Siegel puts it, “Text matters in our 
tradition because it is the site of understandings and practices that au-
thorize, encourage, and empower ordinary citizens to make claims on 
the Constitution’s meaning.”113  This process unfolds both in Congress 
and the courts, in the mainstream news media and viral e-mail cam-
paigns, in the public square and private homes.  But its central feature 
is a democratic contest over the best interpretation of the constitu-
tional text for our time. 
 
110 Certainly, some versions of originalism might allow more room for radical 
change.  See generally Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, supra note 8 (defending 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), by reference to original meaning). 
111 See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, supra note 8, at 112 (“Abandoning originalism allows the 
judiciary to impose value choices that have not been authorized by democratic action.”). 
112 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System:  The Role of 
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF IN-
TERPRETATION, supra note 104, at 3, 40-41 (“A society that adopts a bill of rights is skep-
tical that ‘evolving standards of decency’ always ‘mark progress,’ and that societies al-
ways ‘mature,’ as opposed to rot.”). 
113 Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest:  Gender and the Constitution from a Social Movement 
Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297, 299 (2001) (emphasis omitted). 
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The rules of this contest are fluid and complex, but it is made poss-
ible by the unity, brevity, publicity, and accessibility of the constitutional 
text.  These are the qualities Franklin Roosevelt had in mind when he 
described the Constitution as “a layman’s document, not a lawyer’s con-
tract.”114  And it is these qualities—all fundamentally linked with writ-
tenness—that allow ordinary citizens and popular movements to grasp, 
to engage with, and ultimately to lay claim to the constitutional text as 
support for their own passionately held visions of the American political 
order.  Again, Reva Siegel puts it well:  “Setting forth the terms of the 
constitutional compact in a writing signifies a commitment to transpa-
rency in government. . . . A constitutional order organized on such 
terms allows for ongoing public authorship.”115  Such authorship takes 
place through a number of complex social and institutional mechan-
isms but “because ordinary citizens are not trained legally they take the 
text seriously while nevertheless infusing it with meanings that profes-
sional lawyers are apt to dismiss as unfounded.”116  Sometime these 
meanings gain broad cultural acceptance and serve as catalysts for 
changing judicial interpretations of the Constitution.117 
This process is distinguished from simple, anything-goes politics 
by the centrality of the constitutional text, which serves to channel 
popular constitutional claims into “the medium of a common tradi-
tion.”118  In this respect, popular constitutionalism may seem to re-
semble conventionalism, which also understands the text to perform a 
channeling function.  In reality, however, the two are quite distinct.  
 
114 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address on Constitution Day (Sept. 17, 1937), in THE 
TWO FACES OF LIBERALISM:  HOW THE HOOVER-ROOSEVELT DEBATE SHAPES THE 21ST 
CENTURY 357, 360 (Gordon Lloyd ed., 2007). 
115 Siegel, supra note 113, at 314-15. 
116 Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, Circa 2004, 92 CAL. L. REV. 959, 
981-82 (2004). 
117 See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 113, at 314 (“Outside the courthouse, the Constitu-
tion’s text plays a significant role in eliciting and focusing normative disputes among 
Americans about women’s rights under the Constitution—a dynamic that serves to 
communicate these newly crystallizing understandings and expectations about wom-
en’s rights to judges interpreting the Constitution inside the courthouse door.”); Reva 
B. Siegel, Nicholas deB. Katzenbach Professor of Law and Professor of Am. Studies, 
Yale Law Sch., 2005–06 Brennan Center Symposium Lecture:  Constitutional Culture, 
Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change:  The Case of the de Facto ERA, 
as reprinted in 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1354-55 (2006) [hereinafter Siegel, Constitutional 
Culture] (“[P]olitical-abolitionists and suffragists endeavored to pursue change by ap-
peal to the Constitution.  To achieve change, [they] repudiated officially sanctioned 
accounts of the Constitution’s meaning and sought community recognition of new ac-
counts of the Constitution’s meaning.”). 
118 Siegel, Constitutional Culture, supra note 117, at 1350. 
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While conventionalism sees the role of the text as settling or narrow-
ing the range of social disagreement, popular constitutionalism sees it 
as accommodating, or even encouraging, disagreement.  The idea is 
that the openness of constitutional culture and the perpetually unset-
tled status of constitutional meaning provide a productive outlet for 
social conflict.  If constitutional meaning were irrevocably settled, 
some groups would be permanently cast as constitutional losers, eli-
minating or reducing their sense of participation in a shared commu-
nity.  In a culture of popular constitutionalism, by contrast, the mean-
ing of the foundational document is always up for grabs if one can 
make a sufficiently persuasive case, which the document itself supplies 
the tools for doing.119  This allows “agents of deeply agonistic views 
[to] remain engaged in constitutional dispute, speaking through the 
Constitution rather than against it.”120 
Keith Whittington and Jack Balkin both acknowledge popular 
constitutionalism as consistent with writtenness but nevertheless insist 
that commitment to a written constitution logically requires some 
form of originalism.  Whittington accepts the legitimacy of popular 
constitutionalism but only for the political branches, not the courts.  
Hence his claim, quoted earlier, that only originalism can explain the 
existence of a written constitution “and a judiciary committed to in-
terpreting that text.”121  Unfortunately, the basis for and the extent of 
this concession are both ambiguous.  On the one hand, Whittington 
argues that the democratic accountability of the political branches en-
titles them to embrace evolving popular understandings.122  This sug-
gests a retrenchment to something like Branch One, in which popular 
sovereignty restricts the courts to originalist interpretation.  But if that 
is the case, Whittington’s argument from writtenness fails to provide 
an independent justification for originalism.123  It merely reopens ar-
 
119 Originalism may itself be understood as an attempt to make such a case.  See 
Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657, 708 (2009); Robert Post & Reva 
Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice:  The Right’s Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 545, 548 (2006). 
120 Siegel, Constitutional Culture, supra note 117, at 1327; see also id. at 1350 (“Per-
petual contest about the Constitution’s past and future dynamically sustains its demo-
cratic authority.”); SEIDMAN, supra note 61, at 8 (“Unsettlement theory differs from its 
rivals by making the paradoxical claim that constitutional law can help build such a 
community by creating, rather than settling, political conflict.”). 
121 WHITTINGTON, supra note 8, at 61 (emphasis added). 
122 Id. at 78.  
123 See supra subsection I.A.1. 
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guments about the adequacy of popular sovereignty as a normative 
justification. 
On the other hand, Whittington also suggests that writtenness re-
quires that nonoriginalist constitutional activity by the political 
branches be limited to constitutional construction—that is, to the fill-
ing of gaps in original meaning and the creative application of that 
meaning to particular factual circumstances.  If the legislature goes 
beyond this role to supersede original meaning, Whittington thinks 
that writtenness requires the judiciary to force it back within original-
ist bounds.124  This suggests a view more like Branch Three, in which 
originalism is taken to follow from the commitment to a written con-
stitution—at least where original meaning is discernible and control-
ling—because it is the only approach capable of explaining that 
commitment.  The preceding discussion, however, shows that this is 
not the case.  The written text plays an important role in shaping 
popular understandings, many of which are subsequently incorpo-
rated into judicial interpretations. 
Like Whittington, Jack Balkin acknowledges—indeed celebrates—
the possibility of politically and culturally driven evolution of constitu-
tional meaning.  He even believes, pace Whittington, that courts have a 
role to play in this enterprise.125  Still, Balkin insists that constitutional 
evolution can properly take place only through construction; it cannot 
override original meaning.  Nothing about the nature of writtenness, 
however, explains why this should be the case.  As the preceding dis-
cussion shows, a written constitutional text can usefully serve as a locus 
for normative discourse in a flourishing constitutional culture even 
if—perhaps especially if—its original meaning is displaceable by social 
movements and norm entrepreneurs.  Balkin’s only response is that 
“the rule of law” requires that textual meaning remain constant.126  
This is unpersuasive.  The rule of law—as a minimum baseline re-
quirement—does not require absolute stability in original meaning 
any more than it requires absolute stability in constitutional construc-
tion (which on Balkin’s account, at least, has a far greater influence 
on the Constitution’s practical day-to-day effects).  So long as most 
 
124 See WHITTINGTON, supra note 8, at 56, 79.  
125 See Balkin, supra note 54, at 569-71 (discussing the several ways that courts “en-
gage in constitutional construction,” such as “rationaliz[ing] new constitutional con-
structions by the political branches through creating new doctrines” and “coope-
rat[ing] with the dominant forces in national politics by policing and disciplining 
those who do not share the dominant coalition’s values”).  
126 Id. at 552.  
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constitutional principles remain mostly stable most of the time, the 
rule of law is preserved, even if—in the limiting case—no principle 
remains completely stable all of the time.  Of course, it is possible to 
debate the optimal level of stability above this bare minimum, but 
then we are back to the fixed-constraint variant of Branch One, in 
which case writtenness is doing no independent work. 
Once again, none of this is to suggest that a nonoriginalist popu-
lar constitutionalism is normatively superior to the originalist versions 
defended by Whittington and Balkin.  Those versions may be required 
by popular sovereignty.  They may better promote the rule of law, or 
they may help to foster the sense of shared tradition on which popular 
constitutionalism ultimately depends.  They do not, however, follow 
deductively from our commitment to a written Constitution. 
D.  Pluralist Interpretation 
A final example of nonoriginalist commitment to the written Con-
stitution is the pluralist approach to constitutional interpretation.  
This approach comes in a great many theoretical variants, but its de-
fining characteristic is the recognition of multiple authoritative 
sources of constitutional meaning.  Typically, the list includes text, 
original understanding, historical practice, judicial precedent, and 
moral values, although there are a number of other plausible candi-
dates embraced by different variants.  Pluralist theories draw much of 
their strength from descriptive accuracy:  it is virtually incontrovertible 
that contemporary American constitutional practice has a substantially 
pluralist cast.127  Nevertheless, many pluralist theories have a strong 
normative component as well.  This should not be surprising.  Most 
constitutional theorists believe the American system functions at least 
tolerably well, and if that is the case, the pluralist interpretive ap-
proach that defines it can hardly be all bad.128 
Like the other theories discussed in this Part, pluralist theories of 
interpretation accord the written Constitution an important role.  
Nearly every pluralist theory recognizes text as, at a minimum, the first 
source of interpretive authority among equals.  Most accord the text 
an even more privileged status, embracing the principle that a clear 
 
127 To confirm this, one has only to thumb through any randomly selected volume 
of the U.S. Reports.  Arguments from text, original understanding, history, and 
precedent are ubiquitous in constitutional cases.   
128 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Inter-
pretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1236-37 (1987); see also Strauss, supra note 40, at 888.  
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textual command trumps any contrary interpretive source.129  Unlike 
originalists, however, pluralists do not understand text and original 
meaning as synonymous.  Nor do they accept that the most natural 
reading of the text must always prevail over other interpretive sources.  
Rather, many pluralists that believe the text should be construed to 
cohere with other sources to the maximum extent possible.130  Of 
course, coherence cannot always be achieved.  As established earlier, 
the plausible range of textual meanings does have outer limits,131 and 
most pluralist theories categorically refuse to cross them.  Even those 
that do not recognize departures from the range as momentous and 
requiring special justification.132 
It is clear, then, that pluralist theories are meaningfully commit-
ted to the written Constitution.  The harder question is why pluralists 
accord text such a privileged role.  Unlike the other theories discussed 
in this Part, pluralist theories have often failed to provide a convincing 
answer to this question.  This is partly a product of pluralism’s heavily 
descriptive tilt.  Many pluralist theories are far more concerned with 
“fitting” our constitutional practice than justifying it.  It is also partly 
the result of a self-conscious determination by some pluralist theorists 
that their approach requires no justification.  On this view, pluralist 
interpretive practice is itself the source and measure of legitimacy, ra-
ther than a means to some extrinsically defined social end.133  Regard-
less of the reason, however, pluralist theories have had a lot to say 
about how text informs constitutional interpretation but relatively lit-
tle to say about why that should be so.  Originalists might point to this 
reticence as proof that pluralist theories, while perhaps consistent with 
commitment to a written constitution, cannot plausibly explain or make 
sense of such commitment.  Since originalism can plausibly claim to do 
 
129 See Fallon, supra note 128, at 1195 (“The text, and its plain language, are tak-
en for granted.  Where the text speaks clearly and unambiguously . . . its plain mean-
ing is dispositive.”). 
130 See, e.g., id. at 1195. 
131 See supra Section II.A. 
132 Cf. Michael J. Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason:  A Theory of Con-
stitutional “Interpretation,” 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 551, 591 (1985) (“[T]he text-as-
symbol . . . has served us well as a focal occasion for remembering and then respond-
ing to the central, constitutive aspirations of the tradition. . . . The text-as-symbol 
should be authoritative.” (emphasis omitted)). 
133 See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 237-38 (1982) (“[C]onstitutional 
law needs no ‘foundation.’ . . . We do not have a fundamental set of axioms that legi-
timize judicial review.  We have a Constitution, a participatory Constitution, that ac-
complishes this legitimation.”); Fallon, supra note 128, at 1236-37, 1236 n.219 (making 
a similar claim). 
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so—as we have already seen that it can134—perhaps it is superior to 
pluralist theories on that ground. 
This is an important challenge to the pluralist approach but not 
an insurmountable one.  Indeed, it can be met in a variety of ways.  
Perhaps the best is the approach suggested by Richard Primus, who 
advocates choosing interpretive sources based on their tendency to 
advance relevant constitutional values.135  Primus concludes that this 
choice, which he compares to choosing tools from a kit, ought to be 
undertaken afresh in each case.136  But his basic account can easily be 
adapted to explain the general priority most pluralists accord the con-
stitutional text.  Put simply, the utility of some interpretive sources 
may vary from case to case, but this need not be true for all of them.  
The text, for example, might plausibly be thought to serve systemic 
values requiring that its outer limits be respected across the board.  
An illustration is the possibility, noted by David Strauss, that disregard-
ing the constitutional text in some cases would diminish its value as a 
focal point in all cases.137  If this were true, pluralists might well choose 
among other interpretive sources according to their instrumental val-
ue in particular cases while treating the text as a fixed (though often 
fairly loose) constraint. 
Alternatively, it may be possible to rehabilitate the superficially 
puzzling claim of some pluralists that their approach requires no justi-
fication.  The basis of this claim is what pluralists see as the broad so-
ciological legitimacy—put simply, social acceptance—of a pluralist in-
terpretive approach.  This acceptance cannot obviate the need for 
normative justification, as some pluralist theorists have at times 
seemed to contend.  But acceptance may itself constitute one sort of 
normative justification, roughly akin to implied consent.  The norma-
tive significance of such consent would still have to be defended, of 
course, but implied consent is often invoked to justify the ongoing au-
thority of a particular constitution or set of institutional arrangements.  
There is no obvious reason why it could not be invoked to justify a 
pluralist interpretive practice that accords an important role to the text. 
Finally, pluralists might draw on a variety of small-“c” conservative 
arguments.  If our long-standing constitutional practice is both plural-
ist and text centered,138 perhaps this approach embodies the accumu-
 
134 See supra Section I.C. 
135 Primus, supra note 10, at 167. 
136 Id. at 175-76. 
137 Strauss, supra note 67, at 1734-35.   
138 Cf. Powell, supra note 49, at 943-44. 
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lated wisdom of previous generations, which we should not disregard 
absent compelling reasons.  This is a simple application of the Bur-
kean argument for adhering to established judicial precedents to 
long-standing interpretive practice.139  In addition, pluralists could 
point to the complex web of expectations that has grown up around 
our pluralist interpretive practice.  Lawyers are trained in that prac-
tice; citizens and officials rely on it to predict the direction of future 
judicial decisions.  A radical shift to originalism or any other purist 
approach would disrupt these reliance interests.  At a minimum, this 
must be counted as an important cost of rejecting the pluralist ap-
proach.  If that approach is working tolerably well in other respects—
as many people seem to believe—these reliance interests might be a 
decisive argument for retaining the pluralist status quo, including its 
commitment to the text. 
None of this is meant as a defense of pluralist interpretation on 
the merits.  Pluralist theories may be too susceptible to judicial mani-
pulation.  They may lack the resources to resolve conflicts among dif-
ferent sources of interpretive authority.  Or they may permit undesir-
able drift from the substantively attractive governing philosophy of the 
Founding Generation.  The important point is that the pluralist inter-
pretive approach, like all the other theories discussed in this Part, 
represents a plausible form of nonoriginalist commitment to the writ-
ten constitution.  The list could go on, but most mainstream nonori-
ginalist approaches amount to variations on one or more of the four 
theories already discussed.  At any rate, by now it should be clear:  ori-
ginalism is not the only interpretive approach that can explain our 
commitment to a written constitution.  In fact, all plausible approach-
es can do this.  The writtenness of the Constitution therefore provides 
no basis for choosing originalism over other contenders. 
E.  Other Countries 
If there is any lingering doubt on this score, a glance overseas 
should help to resolve it.  More than 150 countries around the world 
have written constitutions.140  Most of these are much newer and easier 
to amend than the U.S. Constitution, which, if anything, should make 
 
139 See Strauss, supra note 40, at 899. 
140 Varun Gauri, Social Rights and Economics:  Claims to Health Care and Education in 
Developing Countries, 32 WORLD DEV. 465, 465 (2004). 
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originalism more attractive abroad than it is here.141  Yet the limited 
comparative literature on constitutional interpretation suggests that 
such is not the case.  If anything, the contrary is true.  Of course, the 
relevance of foreign practices to American constitutional law is a con-
troversial subject.  Originalists in particular often dismiss foreign prac-
tices as completely irrelevant.142  These dismissals may or may not be 
reasonable in other contexts, but foreign practices are clearly relevant 
to the argument from writtenness.  How could they not be?  That ar-
gument is a claim about the inherent nature of written constitutions.  
If most countries with written constitutions do not adhere exclusively 
or even primarily to an originalist interpretive approach, the claim 
that originalism follows deductively from commitment to a written 
constitution becomes very difficult to credit.  Indeed the claim be-
comes scarcely intelligible.  Perhaps a single country, or even a hand-
ful of countries, might be confused about the requirements of such a 
commitment.  But how could originalism possibly follow deductively 
from writtenness if written constitutions and originalism are not even 
inductively correlated in most cases? 
The comparative literature is too limited to make any confident 
claims about interpretive practices predominating among all countries 
with written constitutions.  But it does establish that originalism is noth-
ing like the dominant approach among large, well-functioning constitu-
tional democracies.  In Canada, for example, Peter Hogg states flatly 
that “[o]riginalism has never enjoyed any significant support.”143  Ra-
ther, “progressive (or dynamic) interpretation, as articulated in the me-
taphor of the ‘living tree’, [is] the dominant theory of interpretation.”144  
A prominent illustration is In re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act, 
 
141 See Coan, supra note 22, at 848-57 (discussing extreme age and difficulty of 
amendment as catalysts for debates in American constitutional theory); see also Primus, 
supra note 10, at 208 (discussing the democratic appeal of originalism as a method for 
interpreting recently adopted constitutional provisions). 
142 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 626-28 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing the Court’s reliance on foreign law); S. Res. 92, 109th Cong. (2005) (dec-
laring that courts should rely on foreign materials only when they “inform an under-
standing of the original meaning of the Constitution”); H.R. Res. 97, 109th Cong. 
(2005) (same); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, An American Amendment, 32 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 475, 475-79 (2009) (asserting that foreign law has no bearing on the proper 
interpretation of the Constitution); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Condorcet and the Con-
stitution:  A Response to The Law of Other States, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1281, 1301 (2007) 
(arguing that “most questions of law and policy are inherently local” and so foreign 
policy choices are irrelevant to American constitutional law). 
143 Peter W. Hogg, Canada:  From Privy Council to Supreme Court, in INTERPRETING 
CONSTITUTIONS 55, 83 ( Jeffrey Goldsworthy ed., 2006). 
144 Id. at 87.   
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where the Supreme Court of Canada read the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms to guarantee substantive as well as procedural due 
process, despite an unambiguous original understanding to the con-
trary.145  The provision in question was Section 7, which establishes the 
right “not to be deprived” of life, liberty, or security of the person “ex-
cept in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.”146  Clear 
evidence established that the Framers had self-consciously used the 
words “fundamental justice” as a term of art to exclude American-style 
substantive due process.147  But although the Charter had been adopted 
only three years earlier, the court refused to embrace this reading on 
the ground that an originalist interpretive approach would destroy “the 
possibility of growth and adjustment over time.”148  The court has stuck 
to this position in years hence, tending to emphasize changing social 
needs and constitutional purposes broadly defined, rather than drafting 
history or original meaning.149 
Germany is in many ways similar.  The constitutional text is central 
to German interpretive practice, with the Federal Constitutional Court 
(FCC) rarely departing radically from its common understanding.150  
Within the bounds of that common understanding, however, the FCC 
has employed a richly pluralist approach to select among the range of 
textually plausible interpretations.  Two features of that practice are es-
pecially noteworthy.  The first is the notion that an “objective order of 
values” stands above and informs the interpretation of the written con-
stitution.151  In practice, this seems to amount to something between a 
pure natural law approach—in which objective moral values trump pos-
itive law—and a Dworkinian “interpretive” approach—in which objec-
tive moral values are employed to make positive law the best it can be.152  
The other noteworthy feature of German practice is its avowedly teleo-
logical character.  As understood by the FCC, this practice mainly en-
tails “an inquiry into the function of a rule, structure, or practice as it 
 
145 See [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, 504-09, 530-32 (Can.). 
146 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, § 7, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 
1982, ch. 11 (U.K.), as reprinted in R.S.C., No. 44 (Appendix II 1985). 
147 [1985] 2 S.C.R. at 504-05. 
148 Id. at 509. 
149 See Hogg, supra note 143, at 84-93. 
150 See Donald P. Kommers, Germany:  Balancing Rights and Duties, in INTERPRETING 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 143, at 161, 190. 
151 Id. at 179-83. 
152 See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 216 (1986) (arguing that a com-
munity that considers “integrity to be central to politics . . . provides a better defense of 
political legitimacy than the other models”). 
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operates within the broad compass of contemporary social and political 
reality.”153  The emphasis is on “practical utility over abstract analysis 
and efficiency over textual literalism.”154  Neither the “objective order of 
values” nor the teleological approach to interpretation is entirely un-
controversial.  Some German judges and scholars argue that these prac-
tices are legitimate only when they draw on values and purposes written 
into the constitutional text by its Framers.155  Occasionally, the FCC even 
couches a decision in such terms.  But more often than not, the court 
eschews originalist analysis altogether.156 
Perhaps the most robust example of nonoriginalist commitment 
to a written constitution is India.  Like the Supreme Court of Canada, 
the Supreme Court of India has interpreted the Indian Constitution 
to guarantee substantive as well as procedural due process, despite a 
clear original understanding to the contrary.157  In doing so, it has es-
poused an unapologetically nonoriginalist approach of constitutional 
interpretation, roughly akin to the common law–framework view dis-
cussed earlier.  Under this approach, “the fundamental rights en-
shrined in the Constitution . . . have no fixed contents.”158  Rather, 
“[f]rom time to time, [the] Court has filled in the skeleton with soul 
and blood and made it vibrant.”159  This approach has produced a 
broad spectrum of substantive rights, ranging from a right to privacy 
to a right to education to a right to clean air and water.160  Yet these 
rights are far from the boldest illustration of nonoriginalism in Indian 
interpretive practice.  That distinction unquestionably goes to the ba-
sic structure doctrine, under which the Supreme Court of India has 
overruled several otherwise valid amendments on the ground that 
they violated the basic constitutional structure.  Supported by a clever 
textual argument but lacking any basis in original understanding, this 
doctrine has over time become a well-established feature of the Indian 
constitutional order.  As a result, the Supreme Court of India is now 
 
153 Kommers, supra note 150, at 200. 
154 Id.  
155 See id. at 182-83, 200. 
156 See id. at 198. 
157 See Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 2 S.C.R. 621, 623. 
158 People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, (2003) 2 S.C.R. 1136, 
1176, quoted in S.P. Sathe, India:  From Positivism to Structuralism, in INTERPRETING CON-
STITUTIONS, supra note 143, at 215, 253. 
159 Id.  
160 See Sathe, supra note 158, at 252-53 (listing also rights to shelter, sufficient food, 
and health). 
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one of the most powerful courts in the world.161  Nevertheless, the writ-
ten text remains central to the Indian constitutional order, as illustrated 
by the court’s elaborate textual defenses of the basic structure doctrine. 
Obviously, these thumbnail sketches are extraordinarily superfi-
cial.  Equally obviously, the interpretive practices of Canada, Germany, 
and India are deeply enmeshed with the complicated—and complica-
tedly different—social and political histories from which they have ari-
sen.  A much fuller analysis would be required to draw significant 
normative lessons for American interpretive practice.  For present 
purposes, however, the basic point suffices:  each of these large, well-
functioning democracies is committed to a written constitution, but 
none is committed exclusively or even primarily to an originalist in-
terpretive approach.  The nonoriginalist practices they are committed 
to might provide excellent models, or terrible ones, for American law-
yers and judges.  More likely, they would not represent a radical break 
from the American status quo.  But their very existence shows that 
originalism is not the only mode of commitment to a written constitu-
tion.162  Of course, in any given context, some forms of commitment 
are more attractive than others.  Nothing in this Part rules out the 
possibility that originalism is the most attractive approach in the 
American context.  But it does not follow deductively from the writ-
tenness of the U.S. Constitution.163 
 
161 See id. (explaining the history of the basic structure doctrine in India and its 
continuing importance). 
162 Thus cornered, proponents of the argument from writtenness might contest the 
nonoriginalist classification of the foreign practices surveyed here.  The difficulty of de-
fining originalism gives this line of defense at least a patina of plausibility.  That patina is 
burnished by the frustrating tendency of the comparative literature to equate originalism 
with a jurisprudence of original intent (as opposed to original meaning or understand-
ing).  Perhaps Canadian, German, and Indian interpretive practices are inconsistent with 
the original intent (or expected application) of their respective constitutions but never-
theless consistent with original meaning defined at a high level of abstraction (which at 
least some American originalists regard as the best understanding of originalism).  This 
seems exceedingly unlikely.  Even if it were true, however, it would be so purely as a mat-
ter of historical contingency, not as a matter of conceptual necessity.  The discussion in 
the main text shows that Canadian, German, and Indian interpretive practices could 
make perfectly coherent sense of their written constitutions even without being consis-
tent with original meaning in this sense.  (Indeed, any such consistency would have to be 
essentially an accident, given the avowedly nonoriginalist rhetoric that prevails in their 
interpretive practices.)  That is enough to refute the originalist claim that originalism 
follows from commitment to a written constitution. 
163 It is worth emphasizing that nothing in this Part eliminates the possibility of 
pragmatic arguments for identifying the written constitutional text with its original 
meaning and nonoriginalist approaches with an unwritten constitution or supplemen-
tation.  Thomas Grey has offered a very interesting argument along these lines.  See 
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III.  THE INTERPRETATION RIDER 
The previous Part demonstrated that originalism is not the only 
way to explain why we keep the written Constitution around.  Many 
other approaches accord the written text an important role in consti-
tutional decisionmaking, without entailing any form of originalism.  
But perhaps our commitment to a written constitution requires more 
than that.  After all, we do not usually speak of judges (or other offi-
cials) according the Constitution an important role in their decisions.  Ra-
ther, we speak of them interpreting it.  Perhaps this implies something 
more than simply according the text an important role—specifically, 
an attempt to discover the actual meaning of the text as it was in-
tended (or would have been understood) at the time of its drafting 
and ratification.164  That seems to be what interpretation ordinarily 
consists of with respect to many other sorts of written documents—
recipes, grocery lists, old letters, and the like.  Perhaps the same is 
true of all written documents, including constitutions.  Perhaps, in 
other words, the search for original meaning is simply inherent in the 
concept of interpretation.  Many originalists have made arguments of 
this sort.165  When careful, they concede that such arguments speak 
only to the nature of interpretation, not to the legitimacy of the Con-
stitution.  They cannot, that is, tell us whether judges (or anyone else) 
should interpret the Constitution or ignore it.  But so long as we ac-
 
Thomas C. Grey, The Uses of an Unwritten Constitution, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 211 (1988).  
The gist is that we should think of judicial creativity as supplementing the written con-
stitution rather than interpreting its open-ended provisions because, where judges are 
exercising substantial discretionary power, that fact should be kept clearly in view.  See 
id. at 233-38.  We might think of Branch One as an argument of this sort, urging that 
identification of nonoriginalist approaches with the written Constitution would elimi-
nate its ability to promote the values of popular sovereignty and constraint.  The im-
portant point about Grey’s argument and this reformulation of Branch One is that 
they are quintessentially and overtly dependent on external normative considerations.  
Rather than arguing that a particular conception of constitutional interpretation fol-
lows from the very nature of writtenness, they argue that a particular conception of 
writtenness is pragmatically useful in advancing the normative goals of an interpretive 
approach, which they recognize must be defended on the merits. 
164 Many proponents of this argument are original-intent, rather than original-
public-meaning, originalists.  But for present purposes, the distinction is immaterial.  
Both versions of the argument have the same essential form and suffer from the same 
defects.  For the sake of simplicity, this Part uses the term original meaning to encom-
pass both original public meaning and original intent. 
165 See, e.g., Stanley Fish, There Is No Textualist Position, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 629, 
635 (2005); Lawson & Seidman, supra note 8, at 71; Prakash, supra note 11; Prakash, 
supra note 12, at 434-37; Saikrishna Prakash, Radicals in Tweed Jackets:  Why Extreme Left-
Wing Law Professors Are Wrong for America, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 2207, 2223-31 (2006) 
(book review); Prakash, supra note 44, at 540-46. 
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cept the Constitution as binding law, originalism is not merely one ap-
proach to constitutional interpretation; it is constitutional interpretation. 
 Call this “the interpretation rider” to the argument from writ-
tenness.  Although it purports to be a purely descriptive exercise in 
analytic jurisprudence, the rider is deeply implausible when unders-
tood as such.  It becomes much more plausible, however, when viewed 
as an example of the rhetorical phenomenon C.L. Stevenson called 
“persuasive definition.”166  Seen through this lens, the rider reveals it-
self as an attempt to resolve a normative debate through tendentious 
redefinition of two normatively charged terms:  interpretation and 
binding law.  There is broad agreement that judges should interpret 
the Constitution as binding law.  Thus, by defining interpretation and 
binding law as synonymous with an originalist approach, the rider ap-
pears to answer the normative question of how judges should decide 
constitutional cases.  But it is only an appearance.  This is not to sug-
gest that the rider’s definitional claims are “purely arbitrary” or “mere-
ly nominal.”  It is certainly not to suggest that they are made in bad 
faith.  Their function, however, is chiefly rhetorical, rather than ana-
lytic.  Consequently, they lack the independent normative significance 
their proponents often attribute to them. 
A crucial premise of this rhetorical analysis is that the rider not 
only fails as a purely descriptive conceptual analysis but is difficult to 
make sense of as such.  To establish this, Part III begins by analyzing 
the rider on its own purportedly descriptive terms.  So conceived, the 
rider admits of both a strong and a modest construction.  As Section 
III.A shows, the former is too unpersuasive and the latter too obvious 
to explain the effort expended by originalists in their defense.  From a 
rhetorical perspective, however, that effort can be understood quite 
readily.  To that end, Section III.B briefly summarizes C.L. Stevenson’s 
account of persuasive definitions.  Sections III.C and III.D proceed to 
apply that account to the rider’s claims about the nature of interpreta-
tion and binding law, respectively.167 
 
166 Stevenson, supra note 13. 
167 The discussion in this Part bears some resemblance to an argument of Frede-
rick Schauer’s.  See Frederick Schauer, The Social Construction of the Concept of Law:  A 
Reply to Julie Dickson, 25 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 493 (2005).  Schauer observes that 
conceptual analysis of socially constructed practices like law can come in two forms:  
purely descriptive (or explanatory) and purely normative.  The former is concerned 
only with describing a particular concept as it is presently understood by a relevant 
community of practitioners.  The latter is concerned with the concept that it would be 
good for us to adopt (or keep), whether it is the concept we have now or not.  As such, 
this form of conceptual analysis must be—and often is—defended through normative 
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A.  “Descriptive” Analysis 
Like the argument from writtenness proper, the interpretation 
rider’s appeal stems in large part from its claim to stand outside the 
fuzzy and inconclusive realm of normative argument.  Of course, the 
idea that judges should interpret the Constitution as binding law is a 
normative claim.  But it is so widely accepted as to be essentially axi-
omatic.  Beyond that, the rider purports to be purely descriptive.  In-
terpretation is the search for original meaning.  To treat the Constitu-
tion as binding law is to follow that meaning.  Many originalists press 
this point with great vigor, but it is unclear what exactly they purport 
to describe. 
The most obvious possibility is the underlying logic or predomi-
nant understanding of some set of actual social practices.168  This is the 
strong construction of the rider as descriptive analysis, and it runs into 
an immediate difficulty:  there is no set of social practices it could 
plausibly describe.  It cannot be a descriptive claim about interpretive 
practice in general because that practice obviously involves far more 
than the search for original linguistic meanings, grocery lists and reci-
pes notwithstanding.  Indeed, it is possible to speak perfectly idiomati-
cally of interpreting “dreams, novels, census data, seismograph 
records, constitutions and the entrails of a chicken,” most of which do 
not have original linguistic meanings at all.169  So the rider is deeply 
implausible as a description of interpretive practice in general. 
Yet the rider’s proponents also do not show any serious interest in 
describing the way interpretation (or the notion of binding law) is ac-
tually understood by officials charged with interpreting constitutions.  
 
argument.  The example Schauer discusses is H.L.A. Hart’s famous defense of legal 
positivism on the ground that it promotes resistance to tyrannical government.  See 
H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 615-
21 (1958).  Recast in Schauer’s terms, the argument of this Part is that originalist ana-
lyses of interpretation and binding law are better understood as normative, rather than 
descriptive, conceptual analysis.  But perhaps out of confusion on this point or perhaps 
out of rhetorical strategy, their proponents generally refuse to supply the normative 
arguments necessary to make them persuasive as such.  Or if they do supply normative 
arguments for originalism, they fail to perceive the necessary connection between 
those arguments and their conceptual claims about interpretation and binding law.  
168 Cf. Joseph Raz, Two Views of the Nature of the Theory of Law:  A Partial Comparison 
(“The criteria that govern people’s use of language are simply the criteria generally 
relied on in their language community for the use of those terms. . . . The correct cri-
teria are those that people who think they understand the concept or term generally 
share . . . .”), in HART’S POSTSCRIPT 1, 16-17 ( Jules Coleman ed., 2001). 
169 Timothy A.O. Endicott, Putting Interpretation in Its Place, 13 LAW & PHIL. 451, 457 
(1994); see also JOSEPH RAZ, BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND INTERPRETATION 241-65 (2009). 
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It seems unlikely, therefore, that the rider is an attempt to describe 
any underlying unity in the social practice of constitutional, or even 
legal, interpretation.  Indeed, if that were its goal, the rider’s claims 
would be wildly implausible.  As Part II demonstrated, the actual prac-
tice of officials interpreting legally binding written constitutions is rad-
ically inconsistent with the rider’s originalist conceptions of interpre-
tation and binding law.170 
Many originalists candidly acknowledge this fact,171 but they fail to 
perceive the difficulty it poses for their purportedly descriptive ambi-
tions.  If not the actual social practice of interpretation in general or 
constitutional interpretation in particular, what could the interpreta-
tion rider possibly be attempting to describe?  The best answer is that 
it is attempting to describe the actual practice of constitutional inter-
pretation but not to describe it comprehensively.  Rather, it is attempt-
ing to isolate and describe two analytically distinct aspects of that prac-
tice.  This weak construction of the rider as descriptive analysis is far 
more plausible than the strong version.  The search for original mean-
ing is not the whole of constitutional interpretation as that activity is 
actually understood by its practitioners.  It is probably not even the 
dominant aspect, but it is undeniably an aspect.  It is also undeniably 
distinct from other aspects of interpretive practice, such as the search 
for the morally best meaning that present-day Americans would rec-
ognize as a plausible understanding of the written text.  The same 
 
170 Even if the originalist account tracked prevailing practice more closely, it is not 
clear what significance that would hold for adherents of competing views.  So long as 
those views are not internally contradictory or otherwise logically untenable, the fact 
that more practitioners held the originalist view (or that the originalist view better tied 
together the intuitions held by most practitioners) would provide no reason to aban-
don nonoriginalist views.  To be sure, most adherents of such views are committed to 
interpreting the Constitution as binding law.  But they are committed to their under-
standing of these concepts, not the originalist understanding.  As such, that commit-
ment could not, standing alone, provide a compelling reason to embrace the original-
ist view, even if originalists were clearly in the majority.  Of course, the same goes for 
the actual world in which originalists are almost certainly in the minority.  Nothing 
about their commitment to interpreting the Constitution as binding law compels them 
to embrace a nonoriginalist approach to these concepts simply because that is the do-
minant form of social practice.  The nonoriginalist approach is not the understanding 
of interpretation or binding law to which they are committed.   
171 Most colorful among them is Justice Scalia: 
It would be hard to count on the fingers of both hands and the toes of both feet, 
yea, even on the hairs of one’s youthful head, the opinions that have in fact 
been rendered not on the basis of what the Constitution originally meant, but 
on the basis of what the judges currently thought it desirable for it to mean. 
Antonin Scalia, Originalism:  The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 852 (1989). 
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goes for the rider’s conception of binding law.  Adherence to original 
meaning is not the only way of being bound by law as contemporary 
interpreters understand that concept.  But it is one way in which some 
interpreters understand themselves as bound at least some of the 
time.  It is also distinct from other ways of being legally bound, such as 
adherence to precedents consistent with the conventionalist meaning 
of the text.  Perhaps this is all the rider stands for—that originalism is 
conceptually distinguishable (and for the sake of analytic precision, 
should be distinguished) from other aspects of interpretive practice. 
This modest construction does not sound much like the sweeping 
claim that originalism is the only way to interpret the Constitution as 
binding law.  According to Stanley Fish, however, that sweeping claim 
is merely a kind of shorthand.  To be sure, it is a shorthand of which 
Fish himself has made ample use.  Like other proponents of the rider, 
he frequently makes arguments to the effect that the search for origi-
nal meaning is “not an approach to interpretation—one possible me-
thod in competition with other methods—it is interpretation.”172  But 
in making such arguments, Fish insists that he does not intend to 
make any claim about the broad class of actual social practices that go 
by the name of interpretation.  In fact, he professes not to care about 
the word “interpretation” at all.  Rather, his aim is simply to clarify 
that, if you are trying to “figure out what somebody meant by some-
thing, asking what somebody else might have meant by it”—or any of 
the other questions posed by nonoriginalist interpreters—“is not 
going to get you there.”173 
The problem with this modest construction is not that it is wrong 
but that it makes the interpretation rider virtually pointless.  No one 
needs Fish’s clarification.  Nonoriginalists are not confused or de-
luded seekers after original meaning.  Nor, for the most part, do they 
deny that original meaning exists as a factual matter, though it may be 
practically difficult or impossible to recover.  It is simply not the mean-
ing nonoriginalists are after.  Rather, they are after another meaning 
altogether—the one that best preserves the text’s conventionalist 
function or the one most consistent with long-established precedents, 
for example.  They might claim that this meaning is the true or the 
best meaning of the text, but that is just another way of saying it is the 
meaning that judges or other officials ought to follow as a normative 
 
172 Stanley Fish, Interpretation Is All There Is:  A Critical Analysis of Aharon Barak’s 
Purposive Interpretation in Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1109, 1112 (2008). 
173 Id. at 1133.   
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matter.  It is not a confused claim that normative considerations can 
somehow transform the text’s original meaning.174  And it is certainly 
not a claim—of the sort Fish imagines—that the best way to discover 
original meaning is by searching for something else. 
Even if confusion along these lines were a real issue, the rider’s 
approach would seem more likely to exacerbate than to dispel it.  Af-
ter all, we already have a term for the practice of searching for and 
submitting to original meaning.  “Originalism” fills that role quite ser-
viceably, despite internecine disagreements among originalists (and to 
some extent their critics175) about its precise contours.  Certainly it is a 
more natural choice than “interpretation” and “binding law,” which, 
 
174 Lawrence Solum seems to think that many nonoriginalist theories of interpre-
tation do in fact make this confused claim.  See Solum, supra note 9, at 65 (“The power 
of the Supreme Court to create legal fictions or tell lies about the meaning of the Con-
stitution cannot change the semantic content of the constitutional text.  But in the 
case of constitutional meaning, lawyers and constitutional theorists sometimes confuse 
the semantic content of a text and the effective legal meaning of the text.”); Posting of 
Lawrence Solum to Legal Theory Blog, Stein on the Domestic Violence Clause & the Fixa-
tion of Original Meaning (Reposted, with Comments), http://lsolum.typepad.com/ 
legaltheory/2009/05/stein-on-the-domestic-violence-clause-the-fixation-of-original-
meaning.html (May 29, 2009) (“Theories of linguistic meanings are positive theories—
they are theories about how language works.  Arguing for a theory of meaning on the 
grounds that it produces normatively attractive results in Constitutional cases involves 
an enormous conceptual error—like arguing that greenhouse gases do not cause glob-
al warming because the world would be a better place if physics were different.”).  But 
the confusion disappears if these nonoriginalist theories are understood as normative 
accounts of how judges and other interpreters should attribute legal (rather than lin-
guistic) meaning to the constitutional text.  To be sure, most nonoriginalists would be 
unwilling to concede that their theories permit legal meaning to deviate from or over-
ride linguistic meaning.  To this extent, they might be thought to contest, at least im-
plicitly, Solum’s descriptive claim that original public meaning is the Constitution’s 
one true linguistic meaning (and to do so on normative, rather than descriptive, 
grounds).  But this is essentially a terminological disagreement.  Nonoriginalists are 
happy to concede that their approach permits interpreters to depart from—indeed to 
contravene—original meaning.  That, after all, is what makes them nonoriginalists.  
Their claim to honor the text’s linguistic meaning is a claim to honor other meanings, 
such as the plausible range of meanings present-day Americans would understand its 
words to bear.  Whether or not these represent linguistic meanings in the technical 
philosophical sense Solum is concerned with, they are plainly an intelligible object of 
inquiry.  See supra Sections I.C, II.A.  The important question is a normative one:  
whether these meanings, or original meaning, ought to be of overriding interest to in-
terpreters.  Of course, that is the same question originalists and nonoriginalists have 
always understood themselves to be debating.  Solum’s heroic efforts to identify origi-
nalism with interpretation and binding law (carefully, openly defined as searching for 
and submitting to linguistic—which is to say original public—meaning of the text) 
change nothing.   
175 See Berman, supra note 10, at 22 (arguing that the term “originalism” should be 
reserved for theories holding that interpreters must follow original meaning whenever 
it is satisfactorily discernible). 
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as they are actually used and understood, carry a variety of meanings 
inconsistent with originalism.  Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a better 
recipe for conceptual confusion than for originalists to begin using 
these terms as synonyms for their own preferred approach.  If they 
stuck with originalism, everyone would know at least roughly what 
they were talking about and that they were speaking descriptively.  But 
if they insist on making interpretation and binding law synonymous 
with originalism, many audiences are bound to misunderstand them 
either as referring to a broader range of practices than they intend to 
or as arguing for the reform of current practice when they mean 
merely to describe a subset of it.  No sensible person would pursue 
this course as a strategy for reducing conceptual confusion.176 
B.  Persuasive Definitions 
Of course, most proponents of the interpretation rider are per-
fectly sensible people.  They include some of the most distinguished 
constitutional theorists in the American legal academy.  It is hard to 
believe that this group would vigorously defend a purely descriptive 
claim as implausible as the strong version of the rider or as obvious as 
 
176 The rider is susceptible of one other arguably descriptive formulation—
namely, that nonoriginalist conceptions of interpretation and binding law are some-
how logically or conceptually impossible, leaving originalist conceptions as the only 
available candidates.  Lawrence Solum seems to take something like this view when he 
argues that the Constitution’s linguistic meaning has to be original public meaning 
because the fixation of meaning at the time of utterance is logically necessary for writ-
ten communication over time.  See Solum, supra note 9, at 66.  But this argument as-
sumes its conclusion.  Whether and to what extent communication should be the goal 
of constitutional interpretation—in the particular sense of receiving a message con-
veyed by specific persons at some prior point in time—is exactly the issue in dispute 
between originalists and nonoriginalists.  If the constitutional text functions (or ought 
to function) instead (or also) as a conventionalist focal point or a medium for popular 
constitutionalist discourse, communication (from the Framers and Ratifiers to con-
temporary interpreters) is not the operative issue.  Solum’s argument describes what 
logically must be the case only on the assumption that the activity he is describing has a 
contested purpose or function.  By taking sides in that contest, he gives up describing 
the concept as it is—i.e., vague or ambiguous, and hence contested—and heads off on 
a frolic of his own.  Cf. Raz, supra note 168, at 26.  As Joseph Raz has cautioned, 
Theoretical explanations . . . tend to be more precise than the contours of the 
vague concept would allow, were one to be true to them. . . .  
  . . . [But] [t]o succeed in explaining our own self-understanding through the 
explanation of some of our concepts requires explaining them as they are. . . .  
 This means that the reduction in vagueness can only be limited, or the ex-
planation will not be true to the concept explained. 
Id. 
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the modest version.  There must, therefore, be another explanation.  
C.L. Stevenson’s notion of “persuasive definition” supplies an illumi-
nating one.  The basic idea is familiar.  As Stevenson explains, “A ‘per-
suasive’ definition is one which gives a new conceptual meaning to a 
familiar word without substantially changing its emotive meaning, and 
which is used with the conscious or unconscious purpose of changing, 
by this means, the direction of people’s interests.”177  Although the 
rider is difficult to make sense of as a descriptive claim, it is perfectly 
intelligible as a persuasive definition in this sense.  It defines interpre-
tation and binding law as synonymous with searching for and submit-
ting to original meaning.  And it strongly appears to do so for the 
purpose of making originalism more compelling to an audience that 
is already committed to interpreting the Constitution as binding law.  
There is much in this claim to unpack.  But first it is necessary to ex-
plain further how persuasive definition works and what it can—and 
cannot—contribute to normative argument. 
It will be helpful to begin with an example far removed from the 
controversies of constitutional theory.  Conveniently, Stevenson offers 
an excellent one.  In the nineteenth century, William Wordsworth and 
other Romantically inclined critics contemptuously dismissed Alexan-
der Pope as “not a poet.”178  Like the interpretation rider and persua-
sive definitions generally, this criticism superficially took the form of a 
descriptive claim—in this case, about the nature of poetry.  Pope was 
not a poet, the Romantics argued, because true poetry is defined by 
passionate emotion and radical innovation.179  Pope’s work, by con-
trast, was self-consciously artificial and imitative.  Therefore, Pope was 
not a poet.  Despite its descriptive patina, it should be obvious that 
this argument is not a neutral exercise in conceptual analysis.  It does 
not reflect an earnest attempt to discern underlying unities in com-
mon or even literary usage.  Nor were the Romantics alerting Pope’s 
defenders to a simple terminological error, as if they had mistaken a 
stool for a table or a rake for a shovel.  Such errors are happily and 
easily cleared up and rarely evoke the sort of passionate commitment 
the Romantics brought to their denigration of Pope.  Rather, as Ste-
 
177 Stevenson, supra note 13, at 331. 
178 ROBERT J. GRIFFIN, WORDSWORTH’S POPE 144 (1996).  Samuel Johnson famous-
ly anticipated this criticism and offered a typically pithy retort:  “If Pope be not a poet, 
where is poetry to be found?”  4 SAMUEL JOHNSON, Pope, in THE LIVES OF THE MOST 
EMINENT ENGLISH POETS; WITH CRITICAL OBSERVATIONS ON THEIR WORKS 1, 79-80 
(Roger Lonsdale ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2006) (1781). 
179 This is a gross oversimplification but one that suffices for present purposes. 
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venson puts it, the words “poet” and “poetry” “are prizes, which [the 
Romantics sought] to bestow on the qualities of [their] own choice.”180  
They withheld the title “poet” from Pope not to describe his work but 
to express their low estimation of it and, more important, to persuade 
others to share that estimation. 
This example illustrates three notable features of persuasive defi-
nition.  First, the term defined must be sufficiently vague or ambi-
guous181 to be susceptible of persuasive redefinition.  “Poetry”—and by 
extension “poet”—unquestionably fits the bill.  The essence of poetry 
has been debated in the West for over two thousand years, with no 
one view able to claim anything like a monopoly on general or profes-
sional usage.  Moreover, the terms “poet” and “poetry”—like many old 
words—have been rendered even less determinate by extensive and 
longstanding metaphorical use, to the point that there is no clear line 
between their literal and figurative meanings.  This is important be-
cause persuasive definition is effective in changing the interests of its 
audience only if it escapes their attention.  When the term in question 
is vague and the persuasive definition bears some resemblance to es-
tablished use, metaphorical or literal, it puts the audience off its 
guard.  Persuasive redefinition of a more precise term—say “tele-
phone pole” or “chainsaw”—would be far more obvious and thus far 
less likely to succeed. 
Of course, it is difficult to imagine anyone getting especially over-
wrought about the true meaning of “telephone pole” or the proposi-
tion that only gas-powered tools qualify as “chainsaws properly so-
called.”  But that brings us to the second notable feature of persuasive 
definition:  the term defined must evoke strong positive or negative 
associations that are sufficiently well established to survive a change in 
conceptual meaning.  Persuasive definition works because “[w]hen 
people learn to call something by a name rich in pleasant associations, 
they more readily admire it; and when they learn not to call it by such 
a name, they less readily admire it.”182  Again, “poetry” and “poet” fit 
the bill perfectly.  At least among the audience of Pope’s Romantic 
 
180 Stevenson, supra note 13, at 333. 
181 Although often used interchangeably in everyday speech, vagueness and ambi-
guity have importantly distinct meanings in the philosophy of language.  See, e.g., TI-
MOTHY A.O. ENDICOTT, VAGUENESS IN LAW 54 (2000) (defining a vague word as one 
with one meaning whose boundaries are unclear and an ambiguous word as one with 
more than one meaning where it is unclear which is being used); Roy Sorensen, Va-
gueness, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Spring 
2009 ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/vagueness (same). 
182 Stevenson, supra note 13, at 332-33. 
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critics, these were terms of strong approbation, almost honorifics—a 
quality sufficiently well established as to be sure of surviving subtle 
changes in their conceptual meaning.  Thus, to succeed in defining 
Pope as “not a poet” and his work as “not poetry” was more than a 
taxonomic victory.  It was also to strip him of a title that evoked in-
stinctive admiration in both the Romantics and their audience. 
The final noteworthy feature of persuasive definition is that it is 
not—or at least it need not be—“merely arbitrary” or “purely nomin-
al.”  It can also draw our attention to important but neglected distinc-
tions.  Stevenson’s poetry example is once again a perspicuous illustra-
tion.  The line Romantics sought to draw between Pope’s work and 
“true poetry” underscored a genuine distinction between two very dif-
ferent poetic sensibilities.  Indeed, the distinction is arguably one of 
profound aesthetic significance, with rough parallels to Descartes’s 
mind/body dualism,183 Nietzsche’s account of Apollinian and Diony-
sian tendencies in Greek drama,184 and various other antinomial pairs 
in Western art and philosophy.  The importance of identifying such 
distinctions should not be understated. 
Yet in declaring Pope “not a poet,” the Romantics were doing 
more than drawing a distinction.  They were also saying, in effect, that 
the distinction warranted stripping Pope of the honorific title of poet.  
Put more precisely, they were saying the distinction revealed Pope’s 
work as lacking the particular set of qualities that justifies the admira-
tion commonly evoked by the title of poet.  If this is true—if the quali-
ties Pope lacked really are the ones that justify our admiration of 
poets—the Romantics may have been right that we should strip Pope 
of the title.  But the mere distinction between neoclassicism and Ro-
manticism, artifice and emotion, imitation and innovation, tells us 
nothing about which set of qualities, if either, merits admiration.  On-
ly a normative argument can do that.  The Romantics, to their credit, 
made plenty of them.  But it was the validity of those normative argu-
ments, and not any definitional claim about poetry, that was crucial to 
their case that Pope should be stripped of his honorific title.  Indeed, 
we can think of their persuasive definition of poetry as a kind of rhe-
torical complement to their normative arguments.  If we find those 
arguments persuasive, a narrowed definition of poetry might be an 
 
183 See RENÉ DESCARTES, MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY 50-62 ( John Cotting-
ham trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1986) (1641). 
184 See generally FRIEDRICH WILHELM NIETZSCHE, THE BIRTH OF TRAGEDY AND OTH-
ER WRITINGS (Raymond Geuss & Ronald Speirs eds., Ronald Speirs trans., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 1999) (1872). 
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appealing way of carrying them into effect.  But definition cannot 
substitute for normative argument. 
C.  Interpretation 
The same complementary relation obtains between the interpreta-
tion rider and normative arguments for originalism.  To see how, it is 
helpful to break the rider into its two constituent parts.  The first is 
the claim that interpretation simply is the search for original meaning.  
As we have seen already, it is difficult to make sense of this claim as a 
matter of descriptive analysis.  It is easy, however, to make sense of it 
as an instance of persuasive definition.  In fact, it tracks the three core 
features of persuasive definition perfectly. 
First, interpretation is a vague term that is commonly applied to a 
wide variety of quite different activities.  It certainly can and often 
does refer to the search for a document’s original meaning, as origi-
nalists would have it.  But, as discussed earlier, it is also commonly 
used to describe a wide range of practices that have little or nothing to 
do with the search for original meaning.185  What these varied activities 
have in common, if anything, is unclear but not particularly important 
for present purposes.  The important point is that the term interpreta-
tion is used flexibly and expansively with no clear line distinguishing 
its literal and metaphorical uses.  For this reason, it is relatively easy 
for a narrow definition of interpretation, emphasizing one easily re-
cognizable subset of interpretive practice, to pass as merely clarificato-
ry or descriptive—perhaps even to its proponents.  Where the precise 
bounds of a term are unclear, it is more difficult to detect when they 
have been moved or crossed. 
Second, interpretation has strong positive associations in the con-
text of constitutional decisionmaking, especially constitutional deci-
sionmaking by judges.  Indeed the idea that judges should interpret, 
rather than make or change, the Constitution is so closely and instinc-
tively associated with core values of our legal system as to be practically 
axiomatic.186  This makes the term “interpretation” a valuable prize 
 
185 See supra Section II.A. 
186 As anecdotal evidence, consider the centrality of this idea in Justice Sonia So-
tomayor’s opening statement at her confirmation hearings.  See The Nomination of Sonia 
Sotomayor to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States:  Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Sotomayor, J.), available at 
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=3959&wit_id=8102 (“The task 
of a judge is not to make the law—it is to apply the law.  And it is clear, I believe, that 
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indeed in normative constitutional discourse.  If originalists can ap-
propriate it for themselves, they will have succeeded in placing their 
theoretical opponents in a very tight rhetorical spot.  Who, in the con-
temporary American legal culture, wants to argue that judges in con-
stitutional cases should do something other than interpret the Consti-
tution?  Perhaps a few contrarian (or tone-deaf) academics, but cer-
certainly no one else. 
As with any persuasive definition, there is a chance that the inter-
pretation rider will come back to haunt its originalist proponents.  If a 
commitment to interpretation entails originalism, some people—
perhaps many—will not like the results.  Rather than accepting origi-
nalism, they may rethink their commitment to interpretation.187  To 
adopt Stevenson’s terminology, the interpretation rider gambles that 
narrowing the conceptual meaning of interpretation will not substan-
tially alter its emotive meaning, which is the source of its power to per-
suade.  This is a bigger gamble than the Romantics took in their at-
tempt to redefine poetry.  Highly salient practical consequences are at 
stake.188  But given the central place of interpretation in American le-
gal cosmology, the originalists’ bet still seems reasonably safe. 
Finally, the rider is neither purely arbitrary nor merely nominal.  
Like the Romantics’ attempt to redefine poetry, the distinction it 
draws is genuine and of genuine importance for the practice in ques-
tion.  The search for original meaning is a very different enterprise 
from the search for the textually plausible meaning most consistent 
with long-standing precedent, contemporary values, or the like.  As 
Section III.A discussed, this distinction, however important, is not like-
ly to trip up many competent practitioners.189  But it is a perfectly 
 
my record in two courts reflects my rigorous commitment to interpreting the Constitu-
tion according to its terms . . . .”). 
187 See supra notes 60 and 169 and accompanying text. 
188 But cf. WILLIAM BLAKE, Jerusalem:  The Emanation of the Giant Albion (“Poetry Fetter’d, 
Fetters the Human Race!  Nations are Destroy’d, or Flourish, in proportion as Their Poetry 
Painting and Music, are Destroy’d or Flourish!”), in THE COMPLETE POETRY AND PROSE OF 
WILLIAM BLAKE 144, 146 (David V. Erdman ed., Univ. of Cal. Press 2008) (1804). 
189 This may be as good a place as any to address the peculiar but insistent origi-
nalist claim that interpretation (defined as the search for original meaning) necessari-
ly precedes evaluation.  See Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes . . . and Constitutions, 85 
GEO. L.J. 1823, 1828 (1997) (“Interpretation must precede evaluation, not vice ver-
sa.”); Paulsen, supra note 8, at 911 (same); Prakash, supra note 165, at 2224 (same).  
This claim is stated as a necessary conceptual truth about interpretation, and, if in fact 
it is such a truth, it may show that contemporary nonoriginalists are more confused 
about the distinction drawn by the rider than I have allowed.  The claim is not, howev-
er, a necessary truth, for at least two reasons.  First, even if interpretation of a written 
text must begin by identifying some finite set of meanings associated with the text, 
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sound distinction and well worth drawing for the sake of analytic clari-
ty.  The problem is that the rider, like the Romantics’ persuasive defi-
nition of poetry, is not merely making a distinction.  It is also saying, 
in effect, that the distinction warrants stripping nonoriginalist ap-
proaches of the rhetorically potent label of interpretation. 
This could be right.  If the best way for judges to decide constitu-
tional cases is to channel the preternaturally wise founders or to hon-
or the democratic judgments of prior generations or to adhere to his-
torically fixed legal commands, perhaps we ought not to dignify 
nonoriginalist approaches with the label of interpretation and the air 
of legitimacy that label carries.  The problem is that the rider’s origi-
nalist proponents, unlike the Romantics, resolutely refuse to make 
normative arguments of this kind.  More precisely, they refuse to 
make such arguments in defense of the rider, though they may en-
dorse them as independent justifications for originalism.  Why this 
should be so is unclear.  Perhaps the rider’s proponents are confused 
about the need for normative arguments in this context.  Perhaps they 
merely wish to maintain the rhetorical advantage of purporting to 
make a purely descriptive claim.  Whatever the explanation, the rider, 
standing alone, is without normative significance.  It is merely an as-
sertion, not an argument.  As such, it cannot tell us which activities 
deserve the rhetorical prize of being called interpretation, much less 
how judges should decide constitutional cases. 
D.  Binding Law 
The story is similar but slightly more complicated for the second 
component of the interpretation rider.  This is the argument that 
submitting to original meaning is the only approach to constitutional 
decisionmaking that treats the Constitution as “binding law.”  As we 
have seen already, this argument is unpersuasive as a description of 
existing interpretive practice.  Many constitutional decisionmakers 
who understand a written constitution as binding law employ nonori-
ginalist approaches.  But before we attempt to make sense of this as-
 
there is no reason to think that this set must be limited to the text’s original meaning.  
The reasons for this have already been discussed at length and need not be revisited.  
Second, there is no reason that the identification of which meanings will count as as-
sociated with the text cannot depend in part on evaluative considerations—either at 
the wholesale level of choosing a theory of interpretation or the retail level of inter-
preting a particular textual provision.  Interpretation is a purposive human practice.  It 
is perfectly natural—indeed, virtually inevitable—that its contours will be shaped by 
the ends for which it is pursued.   
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pect of the rider as persuasive definition, it will be helpful to tease out 
four distinct arguments the rider’s proponents might be intending to 
make.  Each is difficult to make sense of as an exercise in descriptive 
conceptual analysis but makes perfect sense as persuasive definition. 
First, the rider might simply be conflating the Constitution with its 
original meaning.  If the Constitution is synonymous with its original 
meaning, then nonoriginalists by definition do not treat the Constitu-
tion as binding law.  At times, this is what many of the rider’s propo-
nents appear to contend.  But as a normative claim, it obviously begs 
the question at issue.  As a descriptive claim, it is even less persuasive, 
given the pervasiveness of nonoriginalist reasoning in our constitu-
tional practice.  Some sophisticated originalists have expressly dis-
avowed the claim for these reasons,190 and we should not lightly 
attribute such a bad argument to other theorists where plausible al-
ternative readings are available.  As the ensuing paragraphs show, 
such readings are clearly available here. 
Second, the rider might be implicitly invoking an Austinian brand 
of legal positivism that equates law with the command of an identifia-
ble sovereign.191  On this view, which emphasizes the law in “binding 
law,” the only way to treat the Constitution as law is to interpret it as 
the command of the Framers or Ratifiers—or perhaps the sovereign 
people they were taken to represent.  This is related to the popular 
sovereignty rationale for originalism, but unlike that rationale, it 
makes no claim about the political morality of honoring past demo-
cratic commitments.  It simply contends that law by its nature requires 
a sovereign and that, in the case of the U.S. Constitution, the original 
Framers or Ratifiers are the obvious choice.  This view certainly cap-
tures part of what we often mean when we talk about law,192 though it 
is open to question whether the long-dead founders can intelligibly 
serve as an Austinian sovereign. 
Nevertheless, sovereign commands are not the only thing competent 
practitioners commonly conceive of as law, as H.L.A. Hart convincingly 
 
190 See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, supra note 8, at 49 (identifying this sort of argument as 
question begging).   
191 See generally JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 19 
(Wilfrid E. Rumble ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1995) (1832). 
192 See Frederick Schauer, Was Austin Right After All?:  On the Role of Sanctions in a 
Theory of Law, 22 RATIO JURIS (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 6), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1403269 (“[S]overeignty [is] simply an empirical social or 
political fact, and Austin[] . . . understood the legal system as one in which the subjects 
had developed a habit of obedience to the commands of the sovereign . . . .”). 
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demonstrated—in part by reference to modern constitutional law.193  Da-
vid Strauss has made a similar point in less technical terms in his writings 
on common law constitutional interpretation.194  The rider could not, 
therefore, be describing a sociological consensus on the command 
theory of law.  It is simply too plain that no such consensus exists.195 
Third, the rider might be claiming that only the original meaning 
of the Constitution is binding law as a matter of local American juri-
sprudence.  This claim would aspire to the same sort of descriptive 
truth as the claim that the First Amendment bars President Obama 
from forcibly shutting down Fox News.  That claim is uncontroversial-
ly true, given the contemporary state of American constitutional law, 
but it could be otherwise without requiring us to change our concept 
of law as such.  Similarly, originalists might be claiming that the Con-
stitution’s original meaning is legally binding on American judges and 
other officials, even if nothing in our concept of law as such requires 
that this be the case.  Of course, as a matter of positive law, this claim 
is plainly false.  Originalist constitutional decisions are hardly un-
known, but Americans do not generally accept as part of any rule of 
recognition that only originalist constitutional decisions have legal 
force.  As a natural law claim or perhaps a Dworkinian attempt to 
make the best possible moral sense of our existing practices, this read-
ing of the rider is slightly more plausible.  But understood in either of 
these senses, its truth would depend on its attractiveness as a matter of 
political morality, for which the rider’s proponents are at pains to of-
fer no affirmative argument. 
Finally, the rider might simply be a rehash of the Humpty Dumpty re-
ductio.  On this view, which emphasizes the binding in “binding law,” only 
an originalist approach to interpreting the Constitution can impose 
meaningful constraint on judges and other interpretive actors.  For rea-
 
193 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 77 (2d ed. 1994); see also Richard H. Fal-
lon, Jr., How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 CAL. L. REV. 535, 547 (1999) (“[T]he 
legal status of the Constitution does not depend on the ‘command’ of the Framers or 
ratifiers that we, the people of today, act in accordance with the Constitution’s dic-
tates. . . . Rather, the status of the Constitution as law depends on contemporary prac-
tices accepting it as such.”). 
194 See Strauss, supra note 67, at 1749-50 (demonstrating the inconsistency of the Aus-
tinian command theory with a preponderance of American constitutional practice); 
Strauss, supra note 40, at 887-88 (same); Strauss, supra note 97, at 1464-65 (same). 
195 If anything, the consensus view is the contrary.  See Schauer, supra note 192 
(manuscript at 1) (“Jurisprudence contains few axioms, but one of them may be that 
H.L.A. Hart’s critique of John Austin’s brand of legal positivism was conclu-
sive. . . . Hart is widely understood in modern jurisprudential debate to have knocked 
Austin out of the ring.”). 
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sons already discussed at length, this is not a persuasive argument.  Noth-
ing in this Article rules out the possibility that originalism imposes quanti-
tatively greater or more substantively attractive constraints than other 
proaches.  But it is plainly not the only approach that imposes mea-
meaningful constraints.  Indeed all plausible approaches do so.196 
Of these four possibilities, some combination of the second and 
the fourth provides the most plausible account of the claim that the 
rider’s proponents actually intend to make.  But each of the four can 
be neatly assimilated to the three-part account of persuasive definition 
developed in Section III.B.  As each uses the term, “binding law” is va-
gue enough to permit persuasive definition, has strong enough posi-
tive associations to change people’s interests, and is not merely no-
minal but nevertheless sheds no light on the normative question of 
how judges should decide constitutional cases. 
The mere fact that the rider is susceptible to four distinct readings 
is proof that “binding law” is an imprecise term.  But each individual 
reading is also sufficiently vague to allow the rider’s persuasive defini-
tion to pass as clarification or conceptual analysis.  The first trades on 
the vagueness of “the Constitution” rather than “binding law.”  Most 
often “the Constitution” is used to mean the written text bearing that 
name, without taking any position on the proper interpretive ap-
proach.  But the term is also frequently used to refer to particular in-
terpretations of the document, especially originalist interpretations.  
The first reading of the rider exploits this vagueness, though probably 
too transparently to be very effective.  The second reading trades on a 
parallel vagueness in “binding law,” which sometimes refers to the 
command of an identifiable sovereign but often does not.  The third 
reading—that only original meaning is binding as a matter of local 
American jurisprudence—is so implausible that it may be more wish-
ful thinking than persuasive definition.  But it also trades on an ambi-
guity in what people mean when asserting that a proposition is true as 
a matter of domestic law.  Sometimes, this means that the proposition 
accurately describes the state of official practice.  Other times, it is 
used to describe what official practice should be or how that practice 
can most edifyingly be understood.  The fourth and final reading 
trades on the vagueness of what it means for law to be “binding.”  
Generally, this means that a law constrains or eliminates discretion in 
official or private conduct, but it can also be used to describe specific 
forms of legal constraint—most pertinently, the textual command of 
 
196 See supra subsection I.A.2 and text accompanying notes 73-76. 
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an authoritative lawmaker.  All of this vagueness allows the rider to 
pass—to its audience and perhaps its proponents—as clarification ra-
ther than redefinition of what it means to treat the Constitution as 
binding law. 
This is important because, in American legal practice, it is axiomat-
ic that judges and other officials should treat the Constitution as bind-
ing law.  As a result, the term “binding law” has a strongly positive emo-
tive meaning, which each of the four readings of the rider attempts to 
harness in support of originalism.  The first reading pairs the positive 
emotive meaning of “binding law” with the equally positive emotive 
meaning of “the Constitution.”  The second attempts to associate the 
emotive meaning of binding law with a particular—and partial—notion 
of law as such to create the impression that only originalist interpreta-
tion is truly legal.  The third capitalizes on the generally accepted view 
that the responsibility of judges (and other officials acting in an inter-
pretive capacity) is to adhere to American law as it stands, not to re-
make it.  The fourth builds on a related and similarly uncontroversial 
view—that binding law acts as a constraint on judges and other officials 
bound by it.  If the rider succeeds in persuading its audience that only 
an originalist approach treats the Constitution as binding law in any of 
these senses, originalism will likely appear more attractive—perhaps 
close to inevitable—to most American legal practitioners.  “Likely” is an 
important qualifier.  Rather than accepting originalism, some people 
may rethink their commitment to treating the Constitution as binding 
law.197  But as with the interpretation component of the rider, the cen-
tral place of binding law in American legal cosmology makes the origi-
nalists’ bet seem reasonably safe. 
Finally, like the interpretation component of the rider, the “bind-
ing law” component is neither purely arbitrary nor merely nominal.  
Each of the four readings rests on a real distinction between original-
ist and nonoriginalist methods of treating the Constitution as binding 
law.  The first reading depends on the obvious distinction between 
treating original meaning and other factors as controlling for purpos-
es of constitutional interpretation.  The second rests on the distinc-
tion between sovereign commands and other forms of binding law.  
The third reading is more difficult to redeem in this way.  Recon-
structed sympathetically, however, it reflects the important discursive 
(if not jurisprudential) fact that some claims about “what American 
law is” are purely descriptive claims about existing official practice, 
 
197 See supra notes 61 and 169 and accompanying text.   
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while others are at least partially claims about what official practice 
should be or how it is best conceived in a normative sense.  To be 
even minimally plausible, any claim that originalism is binding local 
law in the United States would have to be a claim of the latter sort.  
Finally, the fourth reading rests on a real distinction between different 
forms of legal constraint on official discretion—the command of an 
identifiable sovereign, judicial precedent, the conventionalist text, 
and so on. 
Yet each of the four readings does much more than make a dis-
tinction.  Each also attempts to secure the normatively charged desig-
nation of “binding law” for originalism’s exclusive use.  This might be 
perfectly justified.  If originalism is the best way for judges to treat the 
Constitution as binding law, perhaps we should not dignify nonorigi-
nalist approaches with this legitimacy-enhancing label.  But again, the 
rider’s originalist proponents—perhaps out of confusion, perhaps out 
of rhetorical strategy—resolutely refuse to make normative arguments 
of this kind.  Without such arguments, the rider’s definitional claims 
are assertions, not arguments.  As such, they provide no guidance on 
which practices deserve the rhetorical prize of being called binding 
law, much less on the underlying normative question of how judges 
should decide constitutional cases.  Thus, even as supplemented by 
the interpretation rider, the argument from writtenness fails.  Noth-
ing—or virtually nothing—follows from our commitment to interpret-
ing the written Constitution as binding law. 
CONCLUSION 
The failure of the argument from writtenness has profound impli-
cations for originalism.  Without it, the New Originalism—at least in 
its normative aspect—looks strikingly similar to the old originalism of 
the 1970s and 1980s.  The shift from original intent to original public 
meaning may sidestep some difficult questions about the possibility of 
aggregating collective intentions.  But stripped of the argument from 
writtenness, the affirmative case for the New Originalism largely boils 
down to two very old arguments:  popular sovereignty and the need to 
constrain government officials, especially judges.  A third possibility is 
that originalism produces better substantive results than the available 
alternatives, though this is a position few originalists, New or old, have 
been keen to defend.198  The track records of these three arguments 
 
198 But cf. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION (2004) (offering 
a consequentialist defense of originalism); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, 
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do not inspire confidence, either individually or in combination.  Still, 
nothing in this Article rules out the possibility that one or more of 
them might provide a persuasive justification for originalism.  If they 
cannot, however, as even some New Originalists seem to believe,199 
then originalism is in real trouble.  Perhaps it always has been.  Given 
the ongoing originalism renaissance in the legal academy and, to an 
extent, in the courts,200 this is not a small point. 
Yet the failure of the argument from writtenness may have even 
more important implications for normative constitutional theory as a 
whole.  That failure has its own distinctive aspects, to be sure.  The ar-
gument from writtenness is conspicuous for its attempt to resolve a 
deeply contested normative question without resort to normative ar-
gument.  Among mainstream constitutional theories, this feature is 
essentially unique to originalism, and it is an important reason for the 
failure of the arguments examined in this Article.  If a constitutional 
principle is so commonplace that it requires no normative defense—
as is true of our commitment to interpreting the written Constitution 
as binding law—it is very likely flexible enough to accommodate most 
or all plausible normative theories.  Otherwise, it would never have 
become commonplace.  Recognizing this, if only implicitly, most 
mainstream constitutional theories openly rest on, and supply a de-
fense for, at least some controversial normative premises. 
Nevertheless, the most remarkable feature of the argument from 
writtenness is one it shares with many, perhaps most, other normative 
constitutional arguments:  it operates in blissful ignorance of the real-
world institutions and social conditions through and on which consti-
tutional law operates.  Despite the much-ballyhooed triumph of legal 
realism, despite the rapidly expanding interdisciplinarity of American 
legal scholarship, despite years of savage criticism of constitutional 
theoretical navel-gazing, far too many constitutional theorists remain 
 
Originalism and the Good Constitution, 98 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1109247 (same). 
199 See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 8, at 636 (dismissing popular sovereignty and rule-
of-law defenses of originalism as inadequate); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappa-
port, A Pragmatic Defense of Originalism, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 383, 383 (2007) (similar). 
200 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008); Coan, supra note 22, 
at 847-48 (noting that all nine Justices signed on to predominantly originalist opinions 
in Heller); Randy E. Barnett, Opinion, News Flash:  The Constitution Means What It Says, 
WALL ST. J., June 27, 2008, at A13 (describing the Heller majority opinion as “the finest 
example of what is now called ‘original public meaning’ jurisprudence ever adopted by 
the Supreme Court”).  
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locked in conceptualist castles of their own devising.201  This is particu-
larly true of originalists, but it is true of others as well.  Over the past 
half century, a substantial preponderance of normative constitutional 
theory has consisted of attempts to reason more or less deductively 
from one abstract ideal of democracy or another.202 
This is a trap.  The object of normative constitutional theory is—
or should be—to improve the functioning of a massively complex 
modern society.  Any progress in that direction will require sustained 
examination of the real-world institutions and social conditions 
through and on which constitutional law operates.203  Originalism is a 
perfect case in point.  With the conceptualist castle of writtenness de-
molished, originalists are left to fall back on their old standbys:  popu-
lar sovereignty and constraint.  But the power of these normative justi-
fications is substantially dependent on empirical questions that no 
originalist has ever purported to answer systematically.204  Of course, 
no nonoriginalist has purported to do so either.  Indeed, their very ex-
istence is barely acknowledged by either side.  This indifference to the 
actual functioning of American government is an embarrassment for 
constitutional theory.205 
 
201 This phrase, though not this particular application, is Lawrence Friedman’s.  
See Lawrence M. Friedman, American Legal History:  Past and Present, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 
563, 576 (1984) (“[Constitutional history] is still locked in the castle of conceptualism, 
guarded by fire-breathing dragons.”). 
202 Of course, there are important exceptions, far too numerous to list.  Among con-
temporary theorists, Adrian Vermeule and Barry Friedman deserve particular mention. 
203 For an underappreciated clarion call to this effect, see Barry Friedman, The Im-
portance of Being Positive:  The Nature and Function of Judicial Review, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 
1257 (2004). 
204 This is especially true of the argument from constraint but also applies to the 
argument from popular sovereignty.  As to popular sovereignty:  what sort of con-
straints would original meaning place on contemporary majorities?  How far would 
nonoriginalist decisions depart from the durable views of contemporary majorities?  
To what extent do any such views exist?  And if they do not exist in meaningful num-
bers today, what is the likelihood that they existed at the Founding?  To what extent do 
contemporary Americans identify themselves as members of a temporally extended 
American people?  Is an originalist interpretive approach necessary—as a practical 
matter—to preserve the efficacy of future acts of popular sovereignty (either through 
the legislative process or constitutional amendment)?  As to constraint:  can any inter-
pretive theory meaningfully constrain the decisions of individual judges?  What about 
the decisions of a large, diverse, and politically appointed judiciary?  How does origi-
nalism compare in this respect to other plausible alternatives?  How does it compare with 
respect to practical consequences for the economy, foreign policy, and civil rights? 
205 See ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 3, 9 (2006) (making a 
similar point about American legal theory generally).  
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This observation is hardly new,206 but the failure of the argument 
from writtenness powerfully underscores the disconnect between 
much of normative constitutional theory and the complex empirical 
realities of constitutional practice.  If that theory is to live up to its as-
pirations, if it is to be worthy of the prodigious intellectual labors un-
dertaken on its behalf, a new reality-based approach is urgently 
needed.  Such an approach will not be achieved overnight.  It will re-
quire sustained commitment over years or even decades and careful 
thinking about the relationship of constitutional theory to other aca-
demic disciplines.  But such a commitment is imperative for norma-
tive constitutional theory to justify its continued existence.  If the fail-
ure of the argument from writtenness can help to propel us in that 
direction, it will not have been a total loss. 
 
 
206 See, e.g., NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES:  CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS 
IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 53, 98, 123 (1994); Friedman, supra note 203; 
Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1998); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically?, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 636, 642 (1999). 
